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I. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL OVERVIEW
M OTIVATION-as a psychological construct of human be-
havior-has been the subject of considerable interest, study,
t Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University. The author wishes to ex-
press his appreciation for the research assistance of Maura Hurless, J.D. 1985,
Northern Illinois University, College of Law, in the preparation of this article,
particularly with respect to researching and digesting the psychological litera-
ture; and also for the assistance of his wife, Lorys F. Oddi, Ed. D., in reviewing
and commenting on the material in this article relating to motivation as a psy-
chological construct. No attempt has been made to review in any comprehen-
sive manner the huge body of research regarding human motivation in general,
or as it relates to consumers in particular. Such is well beyond the scope and
purpose of this article. It has been estimated that as many as ten thousand arti-
cles dealing with consumer psychology have been published during the time pe-
riod 1967-1976 alone. See D. SCHULTZ, PSYCHOLOGY & INDUSTRY TODAY 435
(1978) (citing Jacoby, Consumer Psychology: An Octennum, 27 ANN. REV. OF PsY-
CHOLOGY 331 (1976)). The explication of the psychological construct of con-
sumer motivation has been provided only in an attempt to supply a broad
analytical framework for a comparison of the psychological construct with the
legal construct of consumer motivation as seen in trademark and unfair competi-
tion law.
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and disagreement as to its nature and operation.' Within the
1. Littman provides a detailed description of motivation as a psychological
construct of human behavior:
Motivation refers to processes or conditions which may be physiologi-
cal or psychological, innate or acquired, internal or external to the or-
ganism which determine or describe how, or in respect of what,
behavior is initiated, maintained, guided, selected or terminated; it also
refers to end states which such behavior frequently achieves or is
designed to achieve whether they are conditions of the organism or en-
vironment; it also refers to the behavior engaged in, or aspects of that
behavior, in respect of its organization, occurrence, continuation, reor-
ganization, or termination with regard to past or present or future or-
ganic or environmental conditions; further, it refers to the fact that an
individual will learn or remember or forget certain material, as well as
the rate or manner in which these processes occur and the ease or diffi-
culty with which they are altered, as well as to some of the processes or
conditions which are responsible for this behavior; similarly, it deter-
mines how and what perceptual and judgmental activities and outcomes
will occur, as well as some of the conditions and determinants of such
activities and outcomes; similarly, it also refers to the fact of and the
determinants of the occurrence and fate of affective process; finally, it
describes and accounts for various individual differences which appear
in respect of the various behaviors, processes, conditions, and out-
comes referred to above.
Littman, Motives, History and Causes, 6 NEBRASKA'S SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION
136-37 (M. Jones ed. 1958). Psychology is not a field of study characterized by a
body of theory that is internally consistent and accepted by all psychologists.
Rather, the field is characterized by the existence of several schools of thought.
Current ideas about why people do what they do, i.e., the nature of motivation,
can be classified within two broad and seemingly incompatible categories: the
stimulus-response conditioning theories of behaviorism and the cognitive theo-
ries of the Gestalt-field family. M. BIGGE, LEARNING THEORIES FOR TEACHERS 49
(3d ed. 1976). See generally B. WOLMAN, CONTEMPORARY THEORIES AND SYSTEMS
IN PSYCHOLOGY (1960) (presenting comprehensive picture of modern psycholog-
ical theory reflecting two schools of thought). An explanation of these two cate-
gories, although greatly oversimplified, may be helpful. Adherents of
behaviorism tend to view the human organism as a type of machine, in that
humans tend to respond to environmental stimuli on the basis of built-in or-
ganic drives or basic emotions (or by prior conditioning of these drives and
emotions), resulting in behaviors that are predictable and irresistible. These re-
sponses operate more or less automatically. Motivation, for the behaviorist, is
the urge to act that results from this stimulation. M. BIGGE, supra, at 65-68. See
also generally D. HEBB, A TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY (1958) (discussing mecha-
nisms of behavior in learning, perception, and emotion in stimulus-response be-
haviorism manner).
Gestalt-field theorists tend to avoid the emphasis on concepts such as drive
and reinforcement and view behavior as a function of the individual's total situa-
tion: people act within a field of psychological forces, including perception of
events and objects, memories, expectations, purposes, and goals. Thus, for the
Gestalt-field theorist, motivation is not merely a mechanical impulse to act in
response to a stimulus, but a desire to do something emerging from a dynamic
consultation of psychological forces. M. BIGGE, supra, at 68-71. Individual varia-
tions in theory within each school of thought are illustrated by Bigge. Id. at 8-9.
Bigge's work also contains a comprehensive look at the two major schools of
contemporary learning theory. Id. at 49-83. See also generally M. WERTHEIMER,
PRODUCTIVE THINKING (1959) (analysis of Gestalt psychology and discussion of
close relationship between Gestalt psychology and reflective thinking).
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overall psychological construct, consumer motivation in particu-
lar has been intensively investigated from both theoretical and
practical viewpoints. 2 The practical investigations have been pri-
marily concerned with identifying techniques for effectively mar-
keting goods and services. In the context of consumer
psychology, motivation has been defined as follows: "Motivation,
thus, refers to a state of need-arousal-a condition exerting
'push' on the individual to engage in those activities which he an-
ticipates will have the highest probability of bringing him gratifi-
cation of a particular need-pattern."' 3 As with motivation in
general, there is no universally accepted theory of what motivates
consumers to purchase a particular product in preference to an-
other. Broadly speaking, however, it may be said that consumers
are motivated to purchase particular products in an attempt to
satisfy one or more needs.
The needs that motivate consumer behavior may be either
biogenic or psychogenic or some pattern of the two. If psycho-
genic, the needs may be rational or irrational or some pattern of
the two. The consumer may be keenly aware of the need or needs
to be satisfied or such need or needs may be buried in the uncon-
scious mind. The need-pattern of a given consumer could be
quite complex and constantly changing over time.4
2. See generally G. DAY, BUYER ATTITUDES AND BRAND CHOICE BEHAVIOR
(1970); DIMENSIONS OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR (J. McNeal ed. 1965); J. ENGEL,
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR (1982); J. ENGEL, D. KOLLAT & R. BLACKWELL, CONSUMER
BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1973); G. FOXALL, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
(1980); J. HOWARD & J. SHETH, THE THEORY OF BUYER BEHAVIOR (1969); H. KAs-
SARJIAN & T. ROBERTSON, PERSPECTIVES IN CONSUMER BEHAVIOR (1973); G.
KATONA, THE POWERFUL CONSUMER (1960); F. NICOSIA, CONSUMER DECISION
PROCESSES (1966); F. REYNOLDS & W. WELLS, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR (1977); D.
SCHULTZ, PSYCHOLOGY AND INDUSTRY TODAY (1978); C.G. WALTERS, CONSUMER
BEHAVIOR: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1974).
3. Bayton, Motivation, Cognition, Learning-Basic Factors in Consumer Behavior,
in DIMENSIONS OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at 24. Professor Bayton
continues:
Human behavior can be grouped into three categories-motivation,
cognition, and learning. Motivation refers to the drives, urges, wishes
or desires which initiate the sequence of events known as "behavior."
Cognition is the area in which all of the mental phenomena (percep-
tion, memory, judging, thinking, etc.) are grouped. Learning refers to
those changes in behavior which occur through time relative to external
stimulus conditions. Each broad area is pertinent to particular
problems of consumer behavior. All three together are pertinent to a
comprehensive understanding of consumer behavior.
Id. at 21.
4. See id. at 22. As stated by Professor Maslow: "Man is a wanting animal
and rarely reaches a state of complete satisfaction except for a short time. As
one desire is satisfied, another pops up to take its place .... It is a characteristic
19861
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A hypothetical may be illustrative at this point. Suppose the
observed consumer behavior is the purchase of a teapot.5 We
may speculate on the need or needs to be satisfied by this
purchase, i.e., why was the consumer motivated to buy this partic-
ular teapot? Our speculation might lead to the following conclu-
sions concerning that consumer's motivation.
First, it seems quite logical that this consumer has a need for
an implement for brewing tea.6 We could carry this back further
and postulate a basic physiological need for food and drink. Also
the consumer presumably has reached the conclusion that tea
would better satisfy his or her need than a competing beverage,
e.g., coffee or cocoa.
Second, once the class (genus) "teapot" has been arrived at,
the next step in the consumer behavior would logically involve a
cognitive process, 7 such as a cost-benefit analysis, to select a par-
ticular teapot out of the various teapots available for purchase.8
Price may be the primary rational consideration for the selection.
On the other hand, the consumer may find the size of the teapot
an important factor. If the consumer normally desires to brew
eight cups of tea, it would be quite inefficient to purchase a pot
that is capable of brewing only two cups at a time.
Certainly the durability of the pot would be a consideration,
particularly if rough handling were anticipated. There could also
be certain features of the teapot which would bear upon the con-
sumer's decision to purchase a particular teapot over others, e.g.,
the presence of a filter between the brewing chamber and the
spout that blocks tea leaves from escaping when pouring tea into
a cup. 9
of the human being throughout his whole life that he is practically always desir-
ing something." A. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY 69 (1954).
5. The teapot hypothetical was brought to mind by Justice Holmes' famous
property justification for the "tie-in" sale of tea with a patented teapot. See Mo-
tion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 520 (1917)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
6. Of course, a teapot is not the only implement available for brewing tea.
Any vessel capable of holding hot water will do, but if a teapot is purchased,
presumably the other implements would be less likely to satisfy that consumer's
needs.
7. Professor Cropley defines "cognition" as a "procedure through which
people actively seek out, organize and interpret, store, and subsequently reuse
information." Cropley, Some Psychological Reflections on Lifelong Education, in FOUN-
DATIONS OF LIFELONG EDUCATION 209 (R. Dave ed. 1976).
8. Although a consumer may not be entirely satisfied by any of the teapots
available in a given store, one may still be selected because of the time and ex-
pense involved in going to other stores.
9. This feature may be valueless to a consumer who only intends to use
[Vol. 3 1: p. I
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Third, there is the possibility that a consumer buys a particu-
lar teapot not for its obvious utilitarian function of brewing tea
but rather because the consumer intends only to display the tea-
pot, perhaps in a china cabinet. If that is the case, the primary
consideration for selecting a particular teapot would seem to be
its appearance and the desirability of adding such a teapot to the
collection. 0
Fourth, even though its primary function is to brew tea, the
appearance of the teapot may be the primary consideration in its
selection over others by the consumer. Thus, the color, shape,
style, or decoration of a particular teapot may lead to its purchase
because of its compatibility with presently owned dinnerware, or
because of other stylistic reasons.II
Fifth, if we further pursue our speculation we may theorize
that a consumer may have acted irrationally in purchasing a par-
ticular teapot. One type of such irrational behavior is commonly
referred to as "impulse" buying.' 2 The "affective"' 3 appeal of
the product itself may initiate impulsive behavior such as the
purchase of a teapot. The impulse buyer is primarily affected by
the physical attributes of the product-the color, shape, style, or
decoration of the teapot-rather than by its function.' 4
Another type of irrational consumer behavior involves "emo-
tional" buying.' 5 Such consumer behavior may be described as
"emotional" in that the motivation to purchase is primarily based
upon the "symbolic"' 6 appeal of the product as perceived by the
teabags rather than loose tea. On the other hand, an insulated handle may be
the feature that triggers the purchase.
10. The motivation to purchase would, of course, depend on the type of
collection involved-teapots in general or teapots from a particular source.
Price may also play a factor as it does in most purchasing decisions.
11. Presumably the consumer here is making a rational choice to match de-
sign, style, or other characteristics.
12. For a further discussion of "impulse" buying, see infra note 198 and
accompanying text.
13. "Affective" is used in the sense that the product affects the consumer in
such a way that the consumer is driven (impulsively to act) to satisfy a need
generated by its affective appeal. See Woods, Psychological Dimensions of Consumer
Decisions, in DIMENSIONS OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at 33. For a fur-
ther discussion of affective functionality and impulse buying, see infra notes 197-
202 and accompanying text.
14. The affective appeal of the product may also involve the other senses-
the smell of roses or leather, the feel of silk or fur, or the sound of "quality."
15. One commentator has suggested that "[r]esponse to symbolic appeals
might best be termed 'emotional' behavior .... [I]t refers to behavior which is
generated by thinking about the meaning of a product purchase rather than the
function of the purchase." Woods, supra note 13, at 33.
16. The term "symbolic" is used in the sense that a product may be per-
19861
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consumer as satisfying an ego-need (e.g., the perceived status as-
sociated with owning a Wedgwood teapot) rather than upon its
function.
Sixth, whether a consumer desires a teapot for brewing tea or
for display purposes, a particular teapot may be selected over
others because of the reputation of its manufacturer as a desirable
source of teapots.' 7 Motivation to purchase a teapot because of
its source may be a learned response (positively reinforced from
prior satisfactory use) or may even be habitual behavior.' 8 It is
also quite possible, even without prior satisfying use, that adver-
tising has made the consumer aware of a teapot marketed by a
particular source, and the consumer may be motivated to
purchase that teapot on the basis of representations made in the
advertisement as to the desirability of teapots from that source.' 9
Finally, although our speculations have been made on the ba-
sis of a particular need primarily motivating the consumer to
purchase a given teapot, the consumer may be motivated by a
complex of needs. The motivational pattern for a particular
purchase at a particular time could involve the satisfaction of the
utilitarian need for a teapot to brew and the impulsive need to
buy a particular teapot because of its affective appeal based upon
color or shape. Hence, the consumer, on balance, may purchase
a teapot of a particular color even though more expensive than
others of superior quality.20
ceived by the consumer as external evidence of the consumer's desired self-im-
age, e.g., by the product symbolized to its owner's affiliation with a particular
group or a desired status. See Levy, Symbols by Which We Buy, in DIMENSIONS OF
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at 58-64. For a discussion of symbolic func-
tionality, see infra notes 220-94 and accompanying text.
17. It may be said that the consumer is motivated to purchase this particu-
lar "brand" of teapot because of the "goodwill" that the consumer associates
with its source, i.e., the reputation of the source as a supplier of need-satisfying
products.
18. Professor Schultz states that "[h]abits represent routine and easy ways
of responding to complex situations. Decisions do not have to be made, and
alternative behaviors or products do not have to be examined or considered."
D. SCHULTZ, supra note 2, at 461. The market implications of habit on consumer
behavior have been indicated by Professor Bayton: "If the purchase is largely a
habit, there is little cognitive activity available for the competitor to 'work on.'"
Bayton, supra note 3, at 29.
19. The advertising may, of course, go well beyond information concerning
the product's desirable features to stress a nonutilitarian value such as its affec-
tive value or symbolic value.
20. Professor Walters suggests that producers exploit both rational and ir-
rational consumer response:
The very fact that the concept of rationality has pervaded the mar-
keter's thinking for so long has led to some common misconceptions
about normal, consumer decision making. The problem is that instead
[Vol. 3 1: p. I
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As may be seen by the rather cursory speculations outlined
above, consumer motivation concerning even the purchase of a
simple product such as a teapot by one consumer may become
quite complex. Moreover, it is one thing to speculate on con-
sumer motivation; it is yet another to ascertain individual or
group motivation with respect to the purchase of a particular ge-
nus of products or a particular species within a given genus.
In psychological and marketing research, consumer surveys
are used to investigate consumer motivation. 2' Assuming that
consumer surveys are devised and executed according to scientifi-
cally recognized research techniques, a fundamental limitation on
the use of such surveys is that they are based on the premise that
consumers accurately report or are capable of reporting their ac-
tual motivation in making particular purchases. 22
Accuracy in reporting becomes even more speculative when
hypothetical consumers are asked to report what would be their
motivation in making hypothetical purchases. 23 In an attempt to
avoid the shortcomings of consumer survey techniques, other ap-
proaches have been used in consumer motivation research such
as in-depth procedures, including interviews and projective tech-
niques, which seek to ascertain the underlying psychological mo-
tivation of the individual. 24 In-depth techniques, however, are
known to have low reliability and validity.25 Thus, given the pres-
of simply accepting the decision for what it is, labels of rational or non-
rational have to be placed on each decision. It is felt that this tendency
is not only incorrect, it is a disservice to the marketing practitioner who
must appeal to these consumers. Rational appeals do not necessarily
work sometimes and emotional appeals at other times. The soundest
course for the businessman is to appeal to the emotions but provide a
rational reason for buying.
C.G. WALTERS, supra note 2, at 460.
21. For further discussion of psychological research, see D. SCHULTZ, supra
note 2, at 438-39.
22. As indicated by Professor Schultz: "The basic premise underlying the
use of surveys is simple: most people can and will articulate their feelings, reac-
tions, opinions and desires, when asked about them." Id. For example, a con-
sumer may be embarrassed to admit that Brand A was selected because of its
elegant packaging and, therefore, the quality of Brand A may be given as the
reason for its purchase. In fact, the consumer may not be consciously aware that
it was the appearance of the packaging that motivated the purchase.
23. Id. One might expect a difference in response if a consumer is asked
why a particular product was purchased as compared to which product he or she
would purchase if in the market.
24. Id. at 439. For a further discussion of in-depth research methods, see
id. at 439-42.
25. Professor Schultz summarizes the effectiveness of in-depth research
techniques as follows:
Theoretically, the in-depth approach offers ... the ability to reach un-
1986]
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ent understanding of the psychological construct of motivation
and the attendant limitations of research techniques, considerable
care must be exercised in drawing conclusions and making gener-
alizations concerning consumer motivation.2 6
Nonetheless, as a legal construct, consumer motivation in a
number of different contexts affects whether the copying of a par-
ticular product may be proscribed on the basis of either trade-
mark or unfair competition law. In product simulation cases,
consumer motivation is involved-explicitly or implicitly-in the
doctrines of "functionality," 27 "secondary meaning, '28 and "aes-
thetic functionality." 29 Recently, consumer motivation was ap-
proved as a test for determining the "genericness" 30 of a
trademark although the test was quickly disavowed in legislation
by Congress. 3' Broadly, each of these doctrines may be seen as a
conscious levels of motivation, to determine feelings and desires that
could not be reached by direct objective tests and questionnaires.
However, many psychologists suggest that this does not work in reality.
Further, projective tests have a record of low reliability and validity.
Id. at 441.
26. The problem of predicting consumer behavior may further be exas-
cerbated by the diversity of consumers in the market place. For example, one
commentator has categorized consumers into six groups:
1. A habit-determined group of brand-loyal consumers, who tend to be
satisfied with the last purchased product or brand.
2. A cognitive group of consumers, sensitive to rational claims and only
conditionally brand-loyal.
3. A price-cognitive group of consumers, who principally decide on the
basis of price or economy comparisons.
4. An impulse group of consumers, who buy on the basis of physical ap-
peal and are relatively insensitive to brand name.
5. A group of "emotional" reactors, who tend to be responsive to what
products symbolize and who are heavily swayed by "images."
6. A group of new consumers, not yet stabilized with respect to the psy-
chological dimensions of consumer behavior.
Woods, supra note 13, at 34.
27. For a further discussion of the doctrine of "functionality" (in its "utili-
tarian" sense) as it relates to consumer motivation, see infra notes 33-100 and
accompanying text.
28. For a further discussion of the doctrine of "secondary meaning" as it
relates to consumer motivation, see infra notes 101-44 and accompanying text.
29. For a further discussion of the doctrine of "aesthetic functionality" as it
relates to consumer motivation, see infra notes 145-294 and accompanying text.
30. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc. (Anti-Monopoly
II1), 684 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); see
also Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc. (Anti-Monopoly 1), 611
F.2d 296, 302 (9th Cir. 1979) (case in which consumer motivation test was sug-
gested). For a further discussion of the doctrine of"genericness" as it relates to
consumer motivation, see infra notes 295-335 and accompanying text.
31. Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335
(1984) (amending § 14(c) of Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1982)). The
Trademark Clarification Act provides in part: "The primary significance of the
[Vol. 3 1: p. I
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balance between "free" competition theory of free access to
products in the public domain and "fair" competition theory of
excluding competition deemed "unfair.''82
This article will consider the relevance of consumer motiva-
tion to the trademark and unfair competition doctrines of func-
tionality, secondary meaning, aesthetic functionality, and
genericness. Its usage within these doctrines will be analyzed in
an effort to ascertain any underlying presumptions concerning
consumer behavior and competition. Concomitantly, this article
will examine the value of consumer motivation, with reference to
the psychological construct of consumer motivation, as a con-
struct for resolving the legal issue of whether protection against
copying a product or "word, name, symbol or device" should be
afforded. This will be attempted, in the light of preserving the
"right to copy" as a basic tenet of free competition theory, with-
out seriously eroding established fair competition principles of
trademark and unfair competition law.
II. CONSUMER MOTIVATION AND FUNCTIONALITY (UTILITARIAN)
In trademark and unfair competition law, certain presump-
tions are made concerning consumer motivation and competition
which ideally should be consistent with free competition and fair
competition theories, as well as with consumer behavior in the
market place. A basic principle of free competition theory is the
"right to copy" products in the public domain (i.e., unprotected
by patent or copyright); indeed, this principle is mandated by
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 33 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc.3 4 on a federal preemption basis. 3 5
registered mark to the relevant public rather than purchaser motivation shall be
the test for determining whether the registered mark has become the common
descriptive name of goods or services in connection with which it has been used
.... Id. For a further discussion of the Trademark Clarification Act of 1984,
see infra notes 332-33 and accompanying text.
32. See Goldstein, The competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF. L.
REv. 873 (1971). See also Oddi, Product Simulation and Contributory Infringement: A
Right Suggests a Wrong, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 601, 606-09 (1983).
33. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
34. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
35. The full preemption impact of the Sears and Compco decisions has been
eroded over the years. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257
(1979); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). However, the right to copy products and ideas
in the public domain was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Aronson, 440 U.S.
at 264; Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480-81; and Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 568. For a further
discussion of Sears, Compco and related cases, see generally Arnold & Goldstein,
Life Under Lear, 48 TEX. L. REV. 1235 (1970); Brown, Publication and Pre-emption in
19861
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The right to copy is reflected in the common law's abhor-
rence of monopolies in the absence of a patent. As early as 1870,
the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
[The originators of a particular design of plow] have no
patent upon any portion of their plows; anyone, there-
fore, has a perfect right to make plows in their exact si-
militude, even to "the curve of the mould board" and
"the tip of the handles"-in the minutest, as well as in
the most important points .... 36
This dictum proved too broad for general adoption, and courts
began to draw a distinction between the copying of "functional"
and the copying of "nonfunctional" product features. 37
Hence, it was found tortious to copy a nonfunctional product
(or the features thereof), where the product was recognized as
coming from a particular source, had acquired secondary mean-
ing, and the imitation was likely to cause confusion as to the prod-
uct's true source. 38 The latter two requirements implement the
policy considerations of proscribing diversion of trade from the
original source and deception of consumers. Thus, unfair compe-
tition limitations were placed on the right to copy products that
were nonfunctional, had acquired meaning, and were likely to
confuse as to source. According to the first Restatement of Torts,
copying such products constituted the tort of "unprivileged
Copyright Law: Elegiac Reflections on Goldstein v. California, 22 UCLA L. REV.
1022 (1975); Dannay, The Sears-Compco Doctrine Today: Trademarks and Unfair Com-
petition, 67 TRADE-MARK REP. 132 (1977); Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate:
From Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 873 (1971); Leeds, Handler, Deneberg,
Brown & Bender, Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1178
(1964); Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Paintonr Of Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 17 (1971); Zammit, The Ghost of Sears-Compco is Finally Laid to Rest (Or Is
It?) 3 HOFSTA L. REV. 37 (1975).
36. Candee, Swan & Co. v. Deere & Co., 54 Ill. 439, 461 (1870). In Candee,
Swan, a plow manufacturer branded the words "John Deere," in large heavy
black capitals, on the segment of a circle on the beams of his plows. Id. at 446.
The words "Moline, Ill." were branded in small black capitals in a straight hori-
zontal line underneath. Id. The brand on the other plows which constituted the
alleged violation of trademark was the words "Candee, Swan & Co." in small
capital letters, on a segment of a circle that was two inches longer than that of
the complainant's, and the address, "Moline, Ill.," in still smaller capital letters
in a straight horizontal line underneath. Id. at 447. The court held that while
there was some resemblance between the two brands, there was not enough sim-
ilarity between the plows to show that Candee, Swan & Co. intended to sell their
plows as manufactured by John Deere. Id. at 468.
37. See generally Note, Unfair Competition and the Doctrine of Functionality, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 544, 551-58 (1964).
38. See Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 908-
23 (1964) (hereinafter cited as Competitive Torts].
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imitation." 39
The characterization of a product or its features as functional
or nonfunctional was a mandatory step in the determination of
whether the copying was privileged or not. At an early date, two
types of functionality were recognized. In Marvel Co. v. Pearl,40
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused
to enjoin the copying of a syringe on the grounds that a particular
design was essential to its practical use and operation as a syr-
inge.41 The court stated:
In the absence of protection by patent, no person can
monopolize or appropriate to the exclusion of others el-
ements of mechanical construction which are essential to
the successful practical operation of a manufacture, or
which primarily serve to promote its efficiency for the
purpose to which it is devoted . . . "where such similar-
ity" .. . appears to result from an effort to comply with
the physical requirements essential to commercial suc-
cess and not to be designed to misrepresent the origin of
such articles, the doctrine of unfair competition cannot
be successfully invoked to abridge freedom of trade
competition. 42
Hence, a competitor was allowed to copy product features that
had "utility" ("essential to the successful practical operation") or
that promoted the product's "efficiency" of use (because such
features were "essential to its commercial success"). A competi-
tor was not, however, permitted to copy features "designed to
misrepresent" origin. In our teapot hypothetical, the filter block-
ing tea leaves from passing into the spout of the pot would be an
example of a feature having "utility" functionality, and the eight-
cup sized teapot would be an example of "user efficiency"
functionality.
In addition to utility and user efficiency functionality, a third
type-"maker efficiency" functionality-was also recognized at an
early date. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, in Pope Automatic Merchandising Co. v. McCrum-Howel Co. ,43
held that copying the design of a vacuum cleaner was privileged,
39. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 741 (1938). For the full text of § 741, see
infra note 48.
40. 133 F. 160 (2d Cir. 1904).
41. Id. at 161.
42. Id. at 161-62.
43. 191 F. 979 (7th Cir. 1911).
19861
11
Oddi: Consumer Motivation in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law: On t
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
stating that "[i]n short [the originator] uses the most efficient and
most economically manufactured form into which the mechanical
combination can probably be embodied. Not a line, nor a curve,
not a mark, not a bit of superfluous material, for embellishment
or distinction."-4 4 Although it seems unlikely that a consumer
would know and then be motivated to buy a particular product
over others because it was the most efficiently manufactured one,
presumably this efficiency would be reflected in a lower product
cost. Lower cost is likely to be a matter of vital interest to the
consumer.
For convenience these three types of functionality-"utility,"
"user efficiency," and "maker efficiency"-will be grouped to-
gether here under the term "utilitarian functionality." 45
The first Restatement of Torts has been and continues to be in-
fluential in the development and application of the overall doc-
trine of functionality by the various courts. 46 In a topic
designated "Imitation of Appearance" (within the chapter on
"Confusion of Source"), the Restatement sets forth the competing
interests involved: "The public interest in competition ordinarily
outweighs the interest in securing to a person the rewards of his
ingenuity in making his product attractive to purchasers." 47 Sec-
tion 741 of the Restatement specifies the elements of the tort of
"unprivileged imitation,"' 48 as outlined above. Further, section
44. Id. at 981.
45. This is the usage proposed by Judge Rich in In re Morton-Norwich
Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1338 (C.C.P.A. 1982), with the understanding that
"user efficiency" would also be included under the definition of "utilitarian."
46. The Restatement (Second) of Torts was published in 1977. The American
Law institute, however, made the decision not to include a part on "Interference
by Trade Practices," which contained Chapter 35 (Confusion of Source), giving
as a reason therefor: "The law of Unfair Competition and Trade Regulation is
no more dependent upon Tort law than it is on many other general fields of the
law and upon broad statutory developments, particularly at the federal level."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Division 9 introduction note (1977).
47. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 35, topic 3 introductory note (1938).
48. Id. § 741. Section 741, entitled "Elements of Unprivileged Imitation,"
provides:
One who markets goods, the physical appearance of which is a
copy or imitation of the physical appearance of the goods of which an-
other is the initial distributor, markets them with an unprivileged imita-
tion, under the rule stated in § 711, if his goods are of the same class as
those of the other and are sold in a market in which the other's interest
is protected, and
(a) he copied or initiated the appearance after obtaining access to
or procuring the goods, or their labels, wrappers, containers,
styles or designs by improper means or on his promise not to
copy or imitate them, or
(b) the copied or imitated feature has acquired generally in the
[Vol. 3 1: p. I
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742 defines "functional" as follows: "A feature of goods is func-
tional, under the rule stated in § 741, if it affects their purpose,
action or performance, or the facility or economy of processing,
handling or using them; it is nonfunctional if it does not have any
of such effect." 49 Unfortunately, the text of section 742 and the
elaborating comment do not have that degree of lucidity with
which the Restatement is normally favored. The verb "affects" in
the definition is an extremely broad and ambiguous one.50
Although the Restatement definition, reflecting the policy balance
referred to above, goes beyond the long recognized doctrine of
utilitarian functionality, 5' product features having utilitarian func-
tionality clearly fall within the Restatement definition, and courts
continue to cite and rely upon the definition in this context.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)-now the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC) 52-has been highly critical of the Restatement definition of
functionality in general, and of the inclusion of aesthetic function-
ality, in particular. Prior to the Lanham Act, the registration of
market a special significance identifying the other's goods,
and
(i) the copy or imitation is likely to cause prospective pur-
chasers to regard his goods as those of the other, and
(ii) the copied or imitated feature is nonfunctional, or, if it is
functional, he does not take reasonable steps to inform
prospective purchasers that the goods which he markets
are not those of the other.
Id.
49. Id. § 742.
50. Judge Rich is critical of the Restatement terminology:
Further, it appears to us that "affects" and "contributes to" are both so
broad as to be meaningless, for every design "affects" or "contributes
to" the utility of the article in which it is embodied. "Affects" is broad
enough to include a design which reduces the utility or the economy of
manufacture.
In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
51. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit elaborated
on this extension, shortly after the publication of the first Restatement, in J.C.
Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1941). InJ.C.
Penney, the court, in reference to the § 742 definition, concluded that a design
need not be "utilitarian in the technical sense," and may be functional "[i]f...
the public believes generally that a certain feature adds a utilitarian value to the
goods-whether it actually does or not-and will be materially influenced to
purchase them on that basis." Id. at 954. See also Ainsworth v. Gill Glass & Fur-
niture Co., 26 F. Supp. 183, 187 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (holding that the "attractive
appearance [of a lighting fixture] is part of its performance"), aff'd, 106 F.2d 491
(3d Cir. 1939).
52. The CCPA was abolished and the CAFC created by the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Sat. 36 (1982). On October
1, 1982, jurisdiction over appeals from the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
was assumed by the CAFC. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (1982).
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three-dimensional goods, including the product itself and its
container, was denied as not being the proper subject matter of a
trademark. 53 Under the Lanham Act, registration of three-dimen-
sional objects was permitted by the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO)54 and such practice affirmed by the CCPA. 55 As a conse-
53. See, e.g., Sparklets Corp. v. Walter Kidde Sales Co., 104 F.2d 396
(C.C.P.A. 1939) (grooved band on capsule designed to carry liquified gas was
not proper subject for trademark); In re National Stone-tile Corp., 57 F.2d 382
(C.C.P.A. 1932) (registration denied of trademark consisting of shallow indenta-
tion on edge of webs and end walls of hollow tire); In re Dennison Mfg. Co., 39
F.2d 720 (C.C.P.A. 1930) (urn-shaped figure forming patch for tag denied regis-
tration). This approach followed early infringement cases holding that goods
themselves were not the proper subject matter of trademark protection. See, e.g.,
Adams v. Heisel, 31 F. 279 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1887) (chewing gum manufacturer
could not obtain trademark of form of sticks into which gum was made, nor for
shape and decoration of package, nor for arrangement of gum within package);
Davis v. Davis, 27 F. 490 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886) (method of arranging soap in box
was not trademark that could be registered); Fairbanks v. Jacobus, 8 F. Cas. 951
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1877) (No. 4608) (words "Fairbanks' Patent" cast on scales was
not a trademark that could be registered).
54. Exparte Haig & Haig, 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (Comm'r Patents 1958)
("pinch" bottle registrable as "distinctive"). Cf Ex parte Minn. Mining & Mfg.
Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 74 (Comm'r Patents 1952) (sleigh-shaped holder for
adhesive tape not registrable because not within definition of trademark).
These cases relied on § 2 of the Lanham Act in determining which goods
are subject to registration. The pertinent language of § 2 provides: "No trade-
mark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods
of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its
nature .... " Lanham Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1982).
55. Some early cases implied registrability of three dimensional objects.
See, e.g., In re Mcllhenny Co., 278 F.2d 953 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (capped bottle of
pepper sauce denied trademark registration because general public had not ac-
cepted applicant's unlabeled bottles per se as identifying applicant's product); In
re Bourns, 252 F.2d 582 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (configuration of article cannot be reg-
istered as trademark unless it is intended primarily to indicate origin of goods
and ordinary purchaser would be likely to consider that it indicates such origin).
The registrability of three-dimensional goods was made clear in In re Mogen
David Wine Corp. (Mogen David I), 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (design patent
owner could obtain registration of its bottle configuration trademark during life
of its design patent covering the bottle). See also In re Mogen David Wine Corp.
(Mogen David II), 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (denying registration of config-
uration of decanter bottle as trademark for wine because configuration had not
acquired secondary meaning). The registration on the secondary register of a
three-dimensional chemical cake was authorized in In re Minn. Mining and Mfg.
Co., 335 F.2d 836 (C.C.P.A. 1964). Cf Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Dura Elec.
Lamp Co., 247 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1957) (denying protection to "blue dot" on
flash bulbs as not being proper subject matter of trademarks); Alan Wood Steel
Co. v. Watson, 150 F. Supp. 861 (D.D.C. 1957) (denying registration of metal
floor plate as not being proper subject matter of trademark protection).
For further consideration of the registrability of three-dimensional goods,
see Oddi, The Functions of Functionality in Trademark Law, 22 Hous. L. REV. 925
(1985); see also Fletcher, Buildings as Trademarks, 69 TRADE-MARK REP. 229 (1979);
Lunsford, The Protection of Packages and Containers, 56 TRADE-MARK REP. 567
(1966); Whann & Clevenger, A Look Behind the Labels "Functional" and "Nonfunc-
tional "-A Rebuttal, 69 TRADE-MARK REP. 246 (1979); Note, Trademark Protection of
[Vol. 3 1: p. I
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss1/1
CONSUMER MOTIVATION AND TRADEMARKS
quence, the tension between granting trademark protection to
three-dimensional goods and recognizing the right to copy prod-
ucts in the public domain became manifest.
The doctrine of functionality, in the context of trademark re-
gistration, was addressed in 1961 by the CCPA in In re Deister Con-
centrator Co. 56 As one of the "truisms" of trademark law, Judge
Rich posited: "A feature dictated solely by 'functional' (utilita-
rian) considerations may not be protected as a trademark; but
mere possession of a function (utility) is not sufficient reason to
deny protection."5 7 The court refused to permit the registration
of the rhomboidal shape of a coal cleaning table (that was shown
by various publications to provide a highly efficient cleaning sur-
face), "because the shape is in essence utilitarian."5 8 The rationale
was that, with respect to such functional features, "there is an
overriding public policy of preventing their monopolization, of
preserving the public right to copy. A certain amount of pur-
chaser confusion may even be tolerated in order to give the public
the advantage of free competition." 59 Hence, even if the prod-
uct's shape did in fact distinguish the applicant's goods from
others (i.e., had acquired de facto secondary meaning), public
policy would not permit the registration of a product that was "in
essence utilitarian."
A number of courts thought that a public policy balance be-
tween free and fair competition should be struck to condemn the
intentional copying of another's product-irrespective of whether
it is functional or nonfunctional-if consumers were likely to be
confused as to the product's source.60 Such intentional copying
Objects and Configurations: A Critical Analysis, 59 MINN. L. REV. 541 (1975); Note,
Promotional Goods and the Functionality Doctrine: An Economic Model of Trademarks, 83
TEX. L. REV. 679 (1984); Note, The Protectability of Package, Container and Product
Configuration (pts. 1 & 2) 5 U.S.F.L. REV. 451 (1971), 6 U.S.F.L. REV. 172 (1971);
Note, Lanham Act Registration of a Container or Product Shape as a Trademark, 3
U.S.F.L. REv. 327 (1969).
56. 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
57. Id. at 502.
58. Id. at 506.
59. Id. at 504.
60. The now classic example of this condemnation is Stiffel Co. v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 376 U.S. 225 (1964). In
Sears, a comparison of the Stiffel pole lamp with the Sears pole lamp showed a
remarkable likeness in appearance. The functionality of the copied pole lamp
was not considered. The testimony showed that the likelihood of consumer con-
fusion as to the lamp's source existed. Under Illinois law, proof of the likelihood
of confusion as to the product's source was sufficient to make a case of unfair
competition. Furthermore, secondary meaning was held not to be required by
Illinois law. 313 F.2d at 118. For other cases ignoring the functionality issue,
1986]
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was a form of "commercial immorality." 6' It would seem to be the
logical extension of the "appropriation" theory of International
News Service v. Associated Press62 to recognize a "quasi property"
right in the "goodwill" of the product created by the investment
of time and money in it by its originator; hence, the copier was
seeking to "reap where it has been sown." 63 Under this reason-
ing, the wrong was the intentional copying that resulted in the
likelihood of confusion, and the originator would receive an "en-
titlement" as an incentive for investing in the creation of the
production. 64
Whether states could enjoin the copying of products other-
wise in the public domain on an appropriation/entitlement ra-
tionale was brought to a head in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 65
see Note, supra note 37, at 568 n.166. See also American Safety Table Co. v.
Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 277 n. 14 (2d Cir.) (features copied were functional and
simulation was otherwise privileged except for defendant's "commercially im-
moral" practices), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959); Mastercrafters Clock & Radio
Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d
Cir.) ("[the copier's] intention thus to reap financial benefits from poaching on
the reputation of the Atmos clock is of major importance"), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
832 (1955).
61. For a discussion of the "commercial morality" rationale of protection,
see McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal Thought,
69 TRADE-MARK REP. 350, 336-40 (1979). A frequently quoted passage dealing
with justification on fairness grounds comes from Judge Hough's opinion in
Margaret Steiff v. Bing: "What makes the fight unfair is always the borrowing by
the newcomer from the first maker of something not necessary to excellence of
product, not required for functional perfection, yet almost invariably cleverly
calculated to attract and fix the attention, or please the eye of the careless." 215
F. 204, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1914). Cf B.H. Bunn Co. v. AAA Replacement Parts, 451
F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1971) ("Outright copying is often a civilizing rather
than a cannibalizing folkway. The world would be a duller place without the
originators, but it would not work without copyists.").
62. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
63. Id. at 239. The complete quotation is:
In doing this defendant, by its very act, admits that it is taking material
that has been acquired by complainant as a result of organization and
the expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and which is salable by com-
plainant for money, and that defendant in appropriating it and selling it
as its own is endeavoring to reap where it has not sown ....
Id.
64. For a discussion of the "entitlement" rationale and the incentive pro-
vided, see McClure, supra note 61, at 336-40. The protection of trademarks in
non-competitive situations and under dilution rationales has long been advo-
cated. See Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade
Identity Protection, 74 TRADE-MARK REP. 289 (1984); Pattishall, The Dilution Ration-
ale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, Its Progress and Prospects, 71 Nw. U.L.
REV. 618 (1977); Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.
REV. 813 (1927).
65. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
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and Compco v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. ,66 both decided by the United
States Supreme Court in 1964. In Sears and Compco, the Supreme
Court held that the constitutionally based federal patent statute
had preempted individual states from protecting unpatented
products on the basis of unfair competition, because the opposite
result would "give protection of a kind that clashes with the
objectives of the federal patent laws." 67
Since Sears and Compco were based on the supremacy clause
of the Constitution and federal preemption, this would still leave
open the possibility that other federal laws, not specifically pre-
empted, could protect against product simulation. Mr. Justice
Black appears to have recognized this possibility in Compco, where
he stated that "if the design is not entitled to a design patent or
other statutory protection, then it can be copied at will."68 By "other
statutory protection" he may have meant utility patents or copy-
rights. This phrase, however, was later interpreted to include
federal trademark and unfair competition protection under the
Lanham Act.69
Anticipating Sears and Compco, the CCPA asserted the inde-
pendence of trademark protection from patent protection. In In
re Mogen David Wine Co. (Mogen David I),70 decided a few days after
the Sears and Compco decisions but without the benefit of them, the
CCPA held that the ownership of a design patent on a wine de-
canter by the applicant did not, as a matter of law, preclude the
registration of the "ornamental design" as a trademark. 7 1 Judge
Rich concurred to address the issue of the functional nature of
the wine decanter. He maintained that the public's right to copy
involved the "essential distinction between engineering function
and ornamental function."7 2 The table in Deister served the engi-
neering function of increasing efficiency of operation because of
its shape; in contrast, the shape of the decanter was "not in the
66. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
67. 376 U.S. at 231.
68. 376 U.S. at 238 (emphasis added).
69. For a further discussion of the interpretation of "other statutory protec-
tion," see infra notes 70-77 & 82-95 and accompanying text.
70. 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
71. Id. at 929. The majority stated that "the law recognizes that the protec-
tion accorded to a design under the patent laws and that accorded to what
amounts to a trademark under the common law doctrine of secondary meaning
are separate and distinct, and that the rights conferred by law in the one in no
way exclude the rights confined by law in the other." Id.
72. Id. at 933.
1986]
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least essential ... in order to have a fully functioning bottle. '73
Hence, Judge Rich concluded, to prohibit its copying would "not
hinder competition and... [would] not take away from the goods
[bottled wine] something of substantial value." 74
Several years later, in Mogen David JJ,75 the second appeal of
this application to the CCPA, the court held that the applicant was
not precluded from registering a three-dimensional good as a
trademark, provided the other requisites for trademark registra-
tion were met. 76
The definition of functionality for the purpose of registration
becomes highly important in view of the CCPA's position (now
the CAFC's position) recognizing the registrability of three-di-
mensional goods that are either distinctive or have acquired sec-
ondary meaning. 77 The "in essence utilitarian" standard of
"functionality" in Deister proved to share the ambiguity of the Re-
statement and was applied with eclectic results for two decades in
registration cases. 78 Finally, in 1982, the definition was reconsid-
ered by the CCPA in In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc. 79
In an opinion by Judge Rich, the court in Morton-Norwich
equated "functional" with "utilitarian" and then defined "utilita-
rian" to mean " 'superior in function (defacto) or economy of manufac-
ture, 'which 'superiority' is determined in the light of competitive necessity to
copy. ",8 0 Elaborating on this definition, Judge Rich stated:
Thus, it is clear that courts in the past have consid-
ered the public policy involved in this area of law as, not
the right to slavishly copy articles which are not protected
73. Id.
74. Id. (emphasis in original).
75. In re Mogen David Wine Corp. (Mogen David II), 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A.
1967).
76. 372 F.2d at 541-42. But cf. Price Food Co. v. Good Foods, Inc., 400
F.2d 662 (6th Cir. 1968) (holding that non-distinctive and reusable plastic con-
tainers for cheese spread were functional).
77. For a list of three-dimenstional products denied and accepted for regis-
tration by the CCPA and the PTO, see Oddi, supra note 55, at 933-44.
78. Although cases concerning the registration of three-dimensional prod-
ucts have generally involved proof of secondary meaning (see, e.g., Mogen David
11, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967)), registration would seem to be required if the
three-dimensional designs were "distinctive." See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich
Prods., Inc., 671 F2d 1332, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Rich, J.) (spray bottle regis-
trable as distinctive); Ex parte Haig & Haig, 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (Comm'r
Patents 1958) ("pinch" bottle registrable as distinctive). But see In re DC Comics,
689 F.2d 1042, 1050-51 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Niles, J., concurring) (proof of secon-
dary meaning required in all cases involving three-dimensional products).
79. 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
80. Id. at 1339 (emphasis in original).
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by patent or copyright, but the need to copy those arti-
cles, which is more properly termed the right to compete
effectively.8'
The Morton-Norwich rationale seems to indicate that for a product
to be "utilitarian," and hence not registrable, it must be superi-
orly "utilitarian functional" (presuming user efficiency would also
fall within the definition). It is not apparent why inferior designs
would not also be in the public domain.
With respect to unfair competition law, it was not until twelve
years after the Sears and Compco decisions that a federal basis for
the tort of unprivileged imitation was recognized by the courts.
This occurred in Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp. 82 on
the basis of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.83 The copied prod-
uct in the Truck Equipment case was a semi-trailer for hauling
grain.8 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit read into section 43(a) the common law requirements for the
tort of unprivileged imitation, namely, nonfunctionality, secon-
dary meaning, and likelihood of confusion. The court of appeals
affirmed the district court's finding that the trailer features copied
were nonfunctional in that they were "arbitrarily designed for the
purpose of identification, [and] were no more than merely inci-
dentally functional." '85 The court then concluded that "[t]he pro-
hibition against copying of [those features] will not affect
Fruehauf's competitive position in the marketplace." 86
81. Id. (emphasis in original).
82. 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). Section 43(a) provides:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection
with any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a
false designation of origin, or any false description or representation,
including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or repre-
sent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into com-
merce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such
designation of origin or description or representation cause or procure
the same to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to
any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by
any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of
origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any per-
son who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any
such false description or representation.
Id.
84. 536 F.2d at 1213.
85. Id. at 1218. It is interesting to note that the court did not read into
§ 43(a) the broad definition of functionality adopted on a state common law ba-
sis some 34 years earlier. SeeJ.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120
F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1941).
86. 536 F.2d at 1218.
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All of the circuits which have addressed the issue have fol-
lowed Truck Equipment in reading into section 43(a) the common
law requirements for the tort of unprivileged imitation. The
courts have agreed that utilitarian functionality at least will pre-
clude protection. The courts, however, have not always agreed as
to the definition of utilitarian functionality. 7
While not addressing the issue directly, the United States
Supreme Court, in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories,
Inc. ,88 by implication approved reading the common law criteria
into section 43(a). The court rather cryptically held that function-
ality may be relevant to the issue of direct trademark infringement
87. See W.T Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 148 (7th Cir.
1985) (stacking office trays protectable, if nonfunctional); Sicilia Di R. Biebow &
Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1984) (citrus juice bottle design, if found to
be functional, could not be registered); John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks,
Inc., 711 F.2d 966 (11 th Cir. 1983) (nonfunctional elements of blank checks
could be protected under Lanham Act); Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653
F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981) (design of petitioner's light fixture was functional and
could not be registered); Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652
F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981) (copied features of petitioner's "waist away" belt were
functional and thus unprotectable), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982); Vuitton et
Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enter., 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981) (if fabric design on
luggage was found to be nonfunctional, then it may be protected under Lanham
Act); SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir.
1980) (maroon and white color of gelatin capsule containing diuretic was non-
functional); Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1980)
(cylindrical design of container holding crackers was functional); Ives Laborato-
ries v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981) (color of capsules was non-
functional), rev'd sub nom. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,
456 U.S. 844 (1982) (district court's finding that capsule color was functional
was not clearly erroneous); Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance
Mfg., 518 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (petitioner failed to show that trade
dress of its stool was primarily nonfunctional and was denied protection), aff'd,
684 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1982). See also Note, The Problem of Functional Features:
Trade Dress Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 77
(1982).
88. 456 U.S. 844 (1982). In Ives, the Supreme Court held that generic drug
manufacturers could not be held liable as contributory infringers under the Lan-
ham Act for selling a product designed to duplicate the appearance of a compet-
itor's product that was protected under a trademark when pharmacists
mislabeled the generic drugs with the competitor's trade mark. Id. at 854-55.
For a further discussion of Ives, see Germain, The Supreme Court's Opinion in the
Inwood Case: Declination of Duty, 70 Ky. L.J. 731 (1982); Kronzow, McCarthy,
Palladino, Patteshall & Swann, An Analysis of the Ives Case: A TMR Panel, 72
TRADE-MARK REP. 1 (1982); Oddi, supra note 32; Palladino, Trademarks and Com-
petition: The Ives Case, 15 J. MAR. L. REV. 319 (1982); Rogers & Kahan, Recent
Developments Regarding Look-Alike Drugs, 35 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 4 (1980);
Swenson, Property Rights in the Color and Shape of Capsules, 32 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 361 (1977); Note, Lanham Act Protection From the Copying of Trade Dress by Ge-
neric Drug Manufacturers, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1225 (1981); Case Comment,
Generic Drug Laws and Unfair Competition Claims Under the Lanham Act-An Uneasy
Alliance. Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 227
(1980).
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under section 32 of the Lanham Act. 89 In passing, the Court,
relying on Sears and Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. ,90 offered a
definition of functionality: "In general terms, a product feature is
functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it
affects the cost or quality of the article." 9 '
The source of the "essential to the use" language is not evi-
dent. Such language does not appear in the Sears decision on the
page referred to by the Supreme Court in Ives9 2 or, for that mat-
ter, anywhere else in the case. Ironically, the phrase "essential to
the use" appears in Justice Black's much maligned "summation"
in Compco 9 3 on the page cited in the first-appearing unofficial re-
ports of the Ives case. 94 The Kellogg case does not use the verb
"affect" of the Restatement definition but states that the shape of
the biscuits at issue in the case was functional because if made in
another form, this would increase their cost and lower their qual-
ity.9 5 It is far from apparent why the Supreme Court definition
separates the elements of functionality and would require the use
89. 456 U.S. at 857-58 n.20. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982). Cf 456 U.S. at
862-63 (White, J., concurring) (suggesting that functionality should be viewed as
complete affirmative defense to § 32 claim).
90. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
91. 456 U.S. at 850 n.10 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225, 232 (1964); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122
(1938)) (emphasis added).
92. The Ives Court cites to page 232 of the Sears opinion. 456 U.S. at 851
n.10.
93. 376 U.S. at 238. Justice Black stated in Compco:
That an article copied from the unpatented article could be made in
some other way, that the design is "nonfunctional" and not essential to the
use of either article, that the configuration of the article copied may have a
"secondary meaning" which identifies the maker to the trade, or that
there may be "confusion" among purchasers as to which article is
which or as to who is the maker, may be relevant evidence in applying a
State's law requiring such precautions as labeling; however, and re-
gardless of the copier's motives, neither these facts nor any others can
furnish a basis for imposing liability for or prohibiting the actual acts of
copying and selling.
Id. (emphasis added). For a summary of the controversy over this quotation, see
Oddi, supra note 32, at 602-03 nn. 5-8.
94. The United States Law Week page citation to Sears [sic Compco] is "376 U.S.
225, 238 (1964)." 50 U.S.L.W. 4593, 4594 n.10 (U.S. June 2, 1982) (Nos. 80-
2182, 81-11). The same citation appears in United States Patent Quarterly. 214
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 4 n.10 (1982). Seemingly taking an intermediate ground, is
Supreme Court Reports, the citation being "376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964)," which falls
within the Sears case but does not include any reference to functionality or "es-
sential to the use or purpose" as a definition. 102 S. Ct 2182, 2187 n.10 (1982).
95. 305 U.S. at 122. The complete statement from Kellogg is: "The evi-
dence is persuasive that this form is functional-that the cost of the biscuit
would be increased and its high quality lessened if some other form were substi-
tuted for the pillow-shape." Id.
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or purpose to be essential, while the cost or quality need merely be
affected.
In 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, in Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox,9 6 adopted a restrictive
definition of "functional" along the lines of Morton-Norwich:
To achieve the status of "functional," a design or feature
must be superior or optimal in terms of engineering,
economy of manufacture, or accommodation of utilita-
rian function or performance .... A particular design
... may serve functions demanded by the product's man-
ufacturer, but it is not thereby rendered legally func-
tional-and thus unprotectable-unless the design is
only one of a limited number of equally efficient options
and free competition would be unduly hindered by ac-
cording that design trademark protection. 97
The court acknowledged that its "narrower" definition of func-
tionality was reminiscent of an earlier day9 8-indeed perhaps
before Sears and Compco. The court in Cox concluded that "[a]
finding of nonfunctionality . . . will mean that a wide array of
choices remain available to prospective competitors even though
the plaintiff producer acquires a property right in a particular design
or configuration." 9 9 Presumably, whether competition is hin-
dered would be measured by the availability of at least equally
efficient alternatives or by direct evidence on that issue. It is not
clear from the decision which party has the burden of proving
availability of alternatives. 00
96. 732 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1984). The Seventh Circuit rejected this narrow
formulation in W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 148, 151
(7th Cir. 1986) as proposed for use in a jury instruction as being ambiguous in
its use of the word "utilitarian." Judge Posner states that "[bleauty is function,"
id. at 150, but that a design can be protected as a trademark "even though it is
pleasing," id. at 152, with the ultimate test of functionality being whether with-
out this feature "other producers could not compete effectively." Id.
97. Id. at 429.
98. Id. at 429 n.8.
99. Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
100. The burden of proving nonfunctionality has generally been placed on
the party asserting the § 43(a) violation for unprivileged imitation. See Vibrant
Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 909 (1982); Leisurecraft Prods., Ltd. v. International Dictating Equip.,
Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Damn I'm Good, Inc. v.
Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All
Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1980), the court indicated that
it was not clear that it was error to place the burden on the plaintiff to prove
"nonfunctionality." But cf. LeSportsac, Inc. v. K-Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71 (2d
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In light of the foregoing overview of utilitarian functionality
and its application within trademark and unfair competition law,
what presumptions, if any, do the courts appear to be making
concerning consumer motivation and competition? Consumer
motivation and competition are, of course, intimately interre-
lated. If, for whatever reason, consumers are motivated to
purchase a product from a particular source rather than another,
competition in that generic product is affected.
Permitting the copying of utilitarian functional features of a
product-even though this may result in some likelihood of con-
fusion as to the source of that product-has important free com-
petition consequences. If the copying of utilitarian functional
features of a product were enjoined, the consuming public would
be denied access to the function performed by that product ex-
cept from its original source. This would create a product (utilita-
rian functional) monopoly of theoretically perpetual duration.
In contrast, enjoining the use of a confusingly similar trade-
mark (other than one represented by the appearance of the prod-
uct itself) would not seem to have the same anti-competitive
effects; it would merely require competitors to adopt a trademark
that is not confusingly similar. In theory, at least, the effect of
enjoining the copying of nonfunctional features should be the
same. Competitors of the nonfunctional features of a product
would not be placed at a competitive disadvantage by being
barred from copying source-identifying nonfunctional features
used by the originator. They would still have free access to the
utilitarian functional features of the product. All that would be
required of them would be to refrain from copying the source
identifying nonfunctional features of the originator. This, how-
ever, presumes certain consumer behavior.
In terms of consumer motivation, it is presumed (indeed con-
clusively) that consumers are motivated to purchase products
having utilitarian functionality because they wish to satisfy a need
for the product's utility, efficiency of use, or efficiency of manufac-
ture (as reflected in its lower cost), and moreover, that consumers
would exercise a rational, cognitive process in selecting the prod-
uct which is perceived as having the greatest probability of satisfy-
ing such a need. This conclusive presumption seems justified in
terms of free competition principles, provided a reasonable, ob-
jective-product-centered-standard is adhered to for determin-
Cir. 1985) (placing burden on copier to prove functionality). For a further dis-
cussion of LeSportsac, see infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
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ing utilitarian functionality. The fact that some consumers may
be motivated to buy a particular product to satisfy needs other
than its utilitarian functionality-including a need for a product
from a particular source-would not rebut this conclusive pre-
sumption because of the overriding policy interest in free compe-
tition in the utilitarian functions of such products.
On the other hand, if a distinguishing product design is
found to be nonfunctional, i.e., not utilitarian functional, the pre-
sumption appears to be that consumers are motivated to purchase
that product because of its source, i.e., a product from a particular
source has, in the consumer's perception, the highest probability
of satisfying the consumer's needs. If that is the case, it is then
presumed that competition in that product would not be ad-
versely affected if competitors were barred from using those
source-identifying nonfunctional features. The operation of this
latter presumption is evident in Truck Equipment and Mogen David
I, where the conclusion was drawn that competitors would not be
hindered if copying were prohibited, although there does not ap-
pear to be any factual basis for that conclusion. In Morton-Nor-
wich, the presumption appears to be that, unless the design is
"superior in function (de facto) or economy of manufacture,"
permitting the copying of a "nonsuperior" design is conclusively
not "essential to effective competition." In Sicilia, the presump-
tion may be made on the basis of the availability of equally effi-
cient alternative designs.
If consumers are, in fact, primarily motivated to purchase
products found to be not utilitarian functional for reasons other
than desiring a product from a particular source, is it consistent
with the concept of free access to products in the public domain
to deny competitors the "right to copy"? In other words, is the
presumption of no hindrance of competition justified, if con-
sumer motivation to purchase that product is not based on a de-
sire for a product from a particular source? Even though source
association may be shown, it is, of course, possible that consum-
ers are indifferent as to source and are motivated to purchase that
product because of non-source related reasons, in addition to-or
even regardless of-the product's utilitarian function to them,
e.g., on the basis of the product's "aesthetic," or "emotional" ap-
peal. In terms of fair market theory, there would be no diversion
of trade or consumer deception if consumers were motivated to
buy the product for other than source-related reasons.
[Vol. 3 1: p. I
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss1/1
CONSUMER MOTIVATION AND TRADEMARKS
III. CONSUMER MOTIVATION AND SECONDARY MEANING
The significance of consumer motivation in product simula-
tion cases was, at the turn of the century, recognized by Justice
Holmes. While Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme
Court, Justice Holmes, in Flagg Manufacturing Co. v. Holway,1° 1 ar-
ticulated the important different legal consequences arising from
copying a source-identifying mark and from copying the appear-
ance of the product:
But the label or ornament ... would not exist at all, or at
least not exist in that shape but for the intent to deceive;
whereas the instrument sold is made as it is, partly at
least, because of a supposed or established desire of the
public for instruments in that form. The defendant has
the right to get the benefit of that desire even if created
by that plaintiff. The only thing it has not the right to
steal is the goodwill attaching to the plaintiff's personal-
ity, the benefit of the public's desire to have goods made
by the plaintiff.10 2
Justice Holmes, in these few sentences, captured the critical
balance between free and fair competition. In essence, anyone is
free to share in the goodwill of a product' 0 3 (including its
"form") but not in the goodwill associated with the product's
source. In cases where the plaintiff's trademark (in the form of a
label or ornament) is copied, the intent to deceive (i.e., to trade
on the goodwill of plaintiff) will be presumed. Where the plain-
tiff's product is itself copied, however, this same presumption will
not be exercised because of the ambiguity or potential ambiguity
of the copier's intent, which may include, at least in part, the de-
sire to satisfy the public's demand for a product in that form.
Thus, in such cases it would be presumed that the copier intends
101. 178 Mass. 83, 59 N.E. 667 (1901). In Flagg, the plaintiff sued to re-
strain the defendant from selling an exact copy of the plaintiff's zither. Id. at 90,
59 N.E. at 667.
102. Id. at 83, 59 N.E. at 667.
103. As stated by Justice Brandeis in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.:
Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of the
article known as "Shredded Wheat"; and thus is sharing in a market
which was created by the skill and judgment of plaintiff's predecessor
and has been widely extended by vast expenditures in advertising per-
sistently made. But that is not unfair. Sharing in the goodwill of an
article unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right
possessed by all-and in the free exercise of which the consuming pub-
lic is deeply interested.
305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938). For a further discussion of Kellogg, see infra note 139.
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to trade on the goodwill of the product and not the goodwill of
the plaintiff, with the understanding that the copier must properly
indicate itself as a source of the copied product. By stating that
the plaintiff was entitled to the "benefit of the public's desire to
have goods made by the plaintiff," Justice Holmes seems to sug-
gest that, if a plaintiff could show that the public desired goods
made by it, some protection against the copying (at least with re-
gard to source-identifying ornamentation) would be justifiable.
The balance struck by Justice Holmes in Flagg Manufacturing
did not satisfy many courts. Relief was granted-seemingly on an
appropriation/entitlement rationale-in cases involving the slav-
ish copying of the entire product including details not "essential"
to the operation of the product.' 0 4 Early examples of products
copied where at least preliminary relief was granted include: a
coffee mill, 10 5 a padlock, 10 6 a loaf of bread, 10 7 an automobile
light,' 08 and an automobile horn. 10 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
was the leader in providing protection against copying. In Lovell-
McConnell Manufacturing Co. v. American Ever-Ready Co., 110 the court
104. For a further discussion of product simulation, see Competitive Torts,
supra note 38, at 912; see also Note, supra note 37, at 554-55.
105. Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 124 F. 923 (C.C.D.
Conn. 1903), aff'd, 131 F. 240 (2d Cir. 1904). In Landers, Frary, the defendant
manufactured a coffee mill identical to the plaintiff's. 124 F. at 924. The court
enjoined the defendant's practice stating that while the defendant was generally
free to produce coffee mills, it could not manufacture products that were likely
to create a misapprehension in the minds of the purchasing public, or that would
tend to lead the ordinary consumer to mistake the mills for those of the plaintiff.
Id. at 928.
106. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Alder, 154 F. 37 (2d Cir. 1907). In Yale, the
Second Circuit reversed a finding of no unfair competition where the defendant
had copied the same size, coloring, and lettering of the plaintiff's padlock. Id. at
38. The court noted that while dealers might be able to distinguish the two
products, consumers probably would not be able to do so. Id.
107. George G. Fox Co. v. Best Baking Co., 209 Mass. 251, 95 N.E. 747
(1911); George G. Fox Co. v. Hathaway, 199 Mass. 99, 85 N.E. 417 (1908);
George G. Fox Co. v. Glynn, 191 Mass. 344, 78 N.E. 89 (1906) (Massachusetts
courts enjoined various defendants from manufacturing bread of the same gen-
eral shape, size, and appearance as plaintiff's bread).
108. Rushmore v. Manhattan Screw & Stamping Works, 163 F. 939 (2d Cir.
1908). In Rushmore, the court sustained a preliminary injunction against the de-
fendant, who was manufacturing an automobile lamp similar to the plaintiff's.
Id. at 941. This was despite the fact that the defendant had prominently dis-
played its own name on the lamp. Id. at 942.
109. Lovell-McConnell Mfg. Co. v. American Ever-Ready Co., 195 F. 931
(2d Cir. 1912). In Lovell-McConnell, the Second Circuit affirmed a preliminary
injunction prventing defendant from copying an automobile horn that greatly
resembled the plaintiff's. Id. at 932.
110. 195 F. 931 (2d Cir. 1912).
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held that the defendant copier had the burden of proving that a
commercially successful product could not be made unless it had
the copied features." 1I Under the leadership of Judge Learned
Hand, the Second Circuit then began to retreat from this original
position.
While still a member of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, Judge Hand developed the
doctrine of "source motivation" for use in product simulation
cases. In Champion Spark Plug Co. v. A.R. Mosler & Co. ,112 the de-
fendant had copied the appearance of the plaintiff's automobile
spark plugs.' l3 Judge Hand drew a distinction between situations
where the consumer's decision to buy a particular product is mo-
tivated by its source and those situations where the appearance
"may well be a part of the reason why the buyer chooses"''1 4 a
particular product. He observed that in the case of spark plugs,
there would be no danger of losing sight of the distinction, "be-
cause a buyer would not choose a spark plug because its appear-
ance pleases his fancy." 15 However, in criticism of the Lovell-
McConnell line of cases, he asserted that it was only safe to disre-
gard the consumer's motivation in buying a particular product on
the basis of its appearance when the "mechanical operativeness"
of the product mandated the consumer's choice.' 16
Judge Hand continued the development of his "source moti-
vation" theory in Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn and Bishop Co. 117 Sit-
ting by designation to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, Judge Hand began his opinion in Crescent Tool
with the statement: "The cases of so called 'nonfunctional' unfair
competition ... are only instances of the doctrine of 'secondary'
meaning."'1"8 Judge Hand continued:
It will not be enough only to show how pleasing they are,
because all the features of beauty or utility which com-
mend them to the public are by hypothesis already in the
111. Id. at 932.
112. 233 F. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
113. Id. at 115.
114. Id. at 116.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 247 F. 299 (2d Cir. 1917).
118. Id. at 300. Judge Hand equated the term "nonfunctional" with
"nonessential" elements in the mechanical sense. Id. at 301. Under this equa-
tion, it appears that if a particular feature is essential to the mechanical opera-
tion of a product, it is functional; if nonessential to such operation, it is
nonfunctional.
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public domain. The defendant has as much right to copy
the "nonfunctional" features of the article as any others,
so long as they have not become associated with the
plaintiff as manufacturer or source. The critical question
of fact at the outset always is whether the public is
moved in any degree to buy the article because of its
source and what are the features by which it distin-
guishes that source."l 9
Thus, Judge Hand would not only require that the features distin-
guish the product as coming from a particular source ("source
association"), but in addition he would require that the consumer
be motivated to buy it because of its origination from a particular
source ("source motivation"). 120
In sum, the Hand approach in product simulation cases (he
did not appear to rely upon source motivation in ordinary word
mark cases) 121 has two parts. First, the product must be objec-
tively evaluated to determine if the features copied are "essen-
tial" to the product's operation; and if not, a second
determination must be made whether consumers are motivated to
buy the product because of its source.
Shortly after the Crescent case, Judge Hand had the opportu-
nity to apply his source motivation theory of secondary meaning
in Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co. ,122 involving the copy-
ing of the pillow shape of cereal biscuits. On the question of
proof in Humphrey-Cornell, Judge Hand was willing to presume (or
at least draw an inference of) source motivation from the plain-
tiff's long monopoly position (based upon patents) as the single
source of the product.' 2 3 Judge Hand concluded that "when one
has for a long time bought from a single source some article that
one likes, either through conscious reflection or through mere
conservative habit, one is apt to impute to its source a part of its
putative value."' 124 This statement clearly indicates that mere
119. Id. at 300.
120. For a further discussion of source association, see Competitive Torts,
supra note 38, at 913-14. See also Stern, Buyer Indifference and Secondary Meaning in
Unfair Competition and Trademark Cases, 32 CONN. B.J. 381 (1958).
121. See American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Alltex Prods. Corp., 117
F.2d 983, 984 (2d Cir. 1941). In American Brake Shoe, the plaintiff sought to bar
the defendant from marketing its brake design under a similar name. Id. at 983.
The court's affirmance of the trial court's finding that the plaintiff had failed to
prove secondary meaning did not discuss source motivation. Id. at 984.
122. 250 F. 960 (2d Cir. 1918).
123. Id. at 963.
124. Id. Humphrey Cornell is consistent with Kellogg in the sense that neither
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source association of the pillow-shaped biscuits with the Shred-
ded Wheat Co. would not have been sufficient to establish secon-
dary meaning, but it was necessary that consumers, through
extensive purchases over time of the product from a single
source, attribute part of the value of the product to that source.
Hence, the presumption was justified that consumers were moti-
vated to buy the cereal because of the value (i.e., the goodwill)
associated with the source of the cereal.
Although the importance of consumer motivation as a safe-
guard to free competition was recognized in product simulation
cases by two most eminent jurists, Holmes and Hand, the concept
received less than overwhelming acceptance among the courts in
the context of secondary meaning and has most recently been
either disregarded or repudiated.
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, as early as 1939, adopted source motivation as a require-
ment for secondary meaning in product simulation cases,1 25 the
would enjoin copying upon a showing of secondary meaning but only would re-
quire that the copier properly identify its product. See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 118-
19.
Wesson v. Galef, 286 F. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), would seem to be an anoma-
lous decision with regard to the soucre motivation theory of Crescent and
Humphrey Cornell. While sitting on the district court, Judge Learned Hand in
Wesson enjoined the defendant from selling a slavish copy of the plaintiff's re-
volver. Judge Hand went so far as to say:
We usually confine relief to "nonfunctional" elements, because the de-
fendant will suffer nothing by abandoning them; but it does not inevita-
bly follow that only these may be included. If the function be trivial,
possibly these are cases where it might have to yield to a predominant
injury which its continuance might inflict upon the plaintiffs.
Id. at 623. There is no reference in the opinion to a requirement that consumers
be motivated to purchase plaintiff's revolver to establish secondary meaning.
Wesson can perhaps be reconciled with Creicent and Humphrey Cornell on the basis
of a finding that defendants deliberately intended to pass off their product as
plaintiff's. Id. at 625.
125. Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F.2d 450, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1939)
(defendant copied color and marking of plaintiff's steering wheel knobs); see also
Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 266,
270 (7th Cir. 1943) (defendant copied lamp design but clearly affixed its own
trademark).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also adopted the
source motivation requirement of secondary meaning in West Point Mfg. Co. v.
Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 840 (1955).
In West Point, the court held that the plaintiff failed to prove that the public could
be confused about who manufactured its tables, which the defendant had cop-
ied, where the defendant clearly affixed its own trademark to its product and
advertising. 222 F.2d at 596. The court suggested that proof of source motiva-
tion would also be required, stating: "To acquire a secondary meaning in the
minds of the buying public, an article of merchandise when shown to a prospec-
tive customer must prompt the affirmation, 'That is the article I want because I
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court ignored this requirement in the Sears 126 and Compco 127 cases
prior to the Supreme Court's reversal on preemption grounds. 28
In a 1982 decision, Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications,
Inc.,129 the Seventh Circuit ignored consumer motivation in a
product simulation case involving the copying of the version of
the "General Lee" car as seen in the television series, "The Dukes
of Hazard."
In a case involving the same toy car, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit itself repudiated source motiva-
tion as a requirement for secondary meaning. In Warner Brothers,
Inc., v. Gay Tools, Inc. ,l3O the court rejected the source motivation
requirement of Crescent, as well as other Second Circuit cases pur-
porting to apply source motivation' 3' where there had been no
proof of source association.' 32 Accordingly, the court limited
what it perceived to be ambiguous use of the term "motivation"
in those cases to equate it with "source association."'' 33 It would
seem that the Second Circuit would limit Crescent to the first part
of a negative disjunctive-"it nowhere appears that ... the gen-
eral appearance of [a] plaintiff's [product] ha[s] come to indicate
to the public any one maker as its source. ."134 The second
part of the disjunctive is ignored-"or that the [product] ha[s]
been sold in any part because of its source, as distinct from its utility
know its source,' and not the negative inquiry as to 'Who makes that article?' "
Id. at 595 (citing Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co.,
133 F.2d 266, 270 (7th Cir. 1943)).
126. 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 376 U.S. 225 (1964). In Sears the
Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's finding of unfair competition based
solely on the likelihood-of-confusion standard. 313 F.2d at 118.
127. 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
128. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions in the Sears
and Compco cases, see supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
129. 675 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1982).
130. 724 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1983).
131. Id. at 332-33. The court cited to the following cases: American Foot-
wear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1979) (plaintiff failed
to prove source motivation in manufacture of children's sneakers), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 951 (1980); Hygienic Specialities Co. v. Salzman, Inc., 302 F.2d 614
(2d Cir. 1962) (source motivation not proved in design of soap dish); Blisscraft
of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1961) (court would
not enjoin copying of polyethylene pitcher where plaintiff failed to prove source
motivation in regard to design); Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247
F. 299 (2d Cir. 1917). For a further discussion of Crescent Tool, see supra notes
117-20 and accompanying text.
132. 724 F.2d at 333.
133. Id.
134. Crescent, 247 F. at 300.
[Vol. 3 1: p. I
30
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss1/1
CONSUMER MOTIVATION AND TRADEMARKS
or neat appearance."'' 3 5 Evidently, the court had not been re-
ferred to Humphrey Cornell, where Judge Hand seemed to make
clear that proof of source motivation was required, 36 although
this requirement could be satisfied by long, exclusive use of a
product's particular design or appearance. 37
Eliminating the source motivation language from Crescent and
apparently reversing Humphrey Cornell, sub silentio, the Second Cir-
cuit now evidently will apply only the source association require-
ment in both word mark cases and product simulation cases.
Indeed, the court drew its definition of secondary meaning from
Judge Nies' concurring opinion in In re DC Comics, Inc. ,18 which
involved the use of a two-dimensional representation of comic
book characters as a trademark for three-dimensional dolls of the
same characters. In this regard, judge Nies' discussion of con-
sumer motivation is not in reference to the question of secondary
meaning, but is undertaken to refute its use as a test for "generic-
ness," as first suggested by the Ninth Circuit in Anti-Monopoly, Inc.
v. General Mills Fun Group (Anti-Monopoly i).139
The elimination of the source motivation requirement for
proof of secondary meaning in product simulation cases imposes
a seemingly conclusive presumption of consumer motivation to
purchase a nonutilitarian functional product because of its source
if source association is established, even though, in fact, consum-
ers may be primarily motivated to purchase the product for non-
source related reasons. If a narrow definition of "functionality" is
adopted-such as "essential"'' 40 to a product's operation, or
"utilitarian superiority" as required by Judge Rich' 4 ' and the
Fifth Circuit, 142 or even "utilitarian functionality" as defined in
135. Id. at 300-301 (emphasis added).
136. 250 F. at 963.
137. Id. at 963. See also Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F.
Supp. 670, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). In Zippo, source motivation as a type of secon-
dary meaning was established on the basis of consumer survey evidence. Some-
what paradoxically, the Zippo court indicated that the design of a cigarette lighter
might possibly be functional if a broad ("affects the consumer's choice because
of its pleasing appearance") standard were applied. Id. at 696.
138. 689 F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982). For a further discussion of Judge
Nies' opinion in DC Comics, see infra notes 325-27 and accompanying text.
139. 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979). For a further discussion of Anti-Monopoly
I, see infra notes 302-312 and accompanying text.
140. This was the first step in judge Hand's two part analysis. For a further
discussion of this analysis, see supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
141. For a further discussion of judge Rich's approach, see supra notes 79-
81 and accompanying text.
142. For a further discussion of "functionality" in the Fifth Circuit, see
supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
19861
31
Oddi: Consumer Motivation in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law: On t
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Part II 4 3 -the balance between "free" and "fair" competition as
set by Holmes and Hand appears to have been readjusted in favor
of the latter. It is true that the Restatement of Torts approach only
requires proof of source association to establish secondary mean-
ing. 1 44 However, because of the extremely broad definition of
functionality in section 742, the inquiry into whether a feature is
functional does not end upon a determination that the feature is
not utilitarian functional, for, as will be seen in Part IV of this
article, the Restatement subsumes the relevancy of source motiva-
tion under the functionality element of the tort of unprivileged
imitation.
IV. CONSUMER MOTIVATION AND AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY
The doctrine that has come to be known as "aesthetic func-
tionality,"'' 45 recognizes that consumers may be motivated to
purchase products for reasons other than or in addition to utilita-
rian or source-related ones. Hence, even though consumers may
associate the appearance of a product with a particular source,
production against copying will be denied if it is found that the
product is being purchased because of, for example, its aesthetic
value to consumers. The underlying rationale appears to be that
of Justice Holmes and Judge Hand that "form" or "beauty" as
143. For a definition of "utilitarian functionality," see supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
144. According to the First Restatement, a trade name is any designation
which
(a) is adopted and used by a person to denominate goods which he
markets ..., and
(b) through its association with such goods... has acquired a special
significance as the name thereof...
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 716 (1938). The Restatement distinguishes "trade-
marks" from "trade names," in part on the basis of the "acquired special signifi-
cance" required of the latter. Compare § 715 (Definition of Trade Mark) with
§ 716 (Definition of Trade Name). "But a designation is not a trade name until
it has in fact become in the market the name for goods ...coming from or
through a particular source . . . ." Id. § 716 comment a. This acquired secon-
dary significance replaces its former (primary) non-source associated signifi-
cance to the public. Id.
145. See generally Duft, "Aesthetic" Functionality, 73 TRADE-MARK REP. 151
(1983); Fletcher, The Defense of "Functional" Trademark Use. If What is Functional
Cannot be a Trademark, How Can a Trademark Be Functional, 75 TRADE-MARK REP.
249 (1985); Zelnick, The Dctrine of "Functionality", 73 TRADE-MARK REP. 128
(1983); Note, supra note 87; Note, supra note 37; Note, The Broad Sweep of Aesthetic
Functionality: A Threat to Trademark Protection of Aesthetic Product Features, 51 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 345 (1982); Note, The Public Interests and the Right to Copy Nonfunc-
tional Product Features, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 317 (1977); Competitive Torts, supra
note 38.
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well as the utility of a product are in the public domain and may
be freely copied.
In a rather sweeping interpretation 46 of the definition of sec-
tion 742 of the Restatement, the comment to that section treats a
feature as functional "when goods are bought largely for their
aesthetic value ... because they definitely contribute to that value
and thus aid the performance of an object for which the goods are
intended."'' 47 "Performance" is thus not limited to utilitarian per-
formance but includes aesthetic performance.
The comment to section 742 posits the following test for as-
certaining whether product features (including aesthetic features)
are functional: "The determination of whether or not such fea-
tures are functional depends upon the question of fact whether
prohibition of imitation by others will deprive the others of some-
thing which will substantially hinder them in competition."'' 4 In
the negative form, the comment defines a "nonfunctional fea-
ture" as one having such effect that, "when omitted, nothing of
substantial value in the goods is lost."' 49 Presumably this would
include "aesthetic value."
In further elaboration, the Restatement comment is careful to
exclude from the definition of functional those features which
"merely associate goods with a particular source."' 150 Thus,
although a feature of a product that acts as a trademark "may be a
substantial factor in increasing the marketability" of that product,
146. The case authority supporting a broad interpretation of § 742 is rather
thin. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 3-35 (Tentative Draft No. 17 1938) (prede-
cessor of § 742 of official draft). The following cases, with the functional feature
indicated parenthetically, are cited in the Tentative Draft: Keystone Type Foun-
dry v. Portland Pub. Co., 186 F. 690 (1st Cir. 1911) (distinctive printing type
face); Smith v. Krause, 160 F. 270 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908) (ribbon with "Merrie
Christmas" woven on it), aff'd, 166 F. 1021 (2d Cir. 1909); Diamond Match Co.
v. Saginaw Match Co., 142 F. 727 (6th Cir.) (bi-colored match tip), cert. denied,
203 U.S. 589 (1906); In re American Circular Loom Co., 28 App. D.C. 446
(1906) (sparkling finish for insulating tubes). Reference is also made in the Ten-
tative Draft to the cases cited to § 3-34, clause (b), which comprise Judge Hand's
decisions in Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299 (2d Cir.
1917), and Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960 (2d Cir.
1918). Of these cases, only Smith v. Krause would clearly appear to support an
interpretation that the words "Merrie Christmas" affect the "performance" of
the ribbon in the sense of its aesthetic (more specifically, "symbolic") value:
"The truth is the words, when put on the ribbon, are not a trade-mark, but are
an integral part of the ribbon adding to its value." 160 F.2d at 271 (emphasis
added).
147. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742 comment a (1938).
148. Id.
149. Id..
150. Id.
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such a feature is nonfunctional if its "entire significance ... lies
only in a demand for goods associated with a particular source
rather than for goods of a particular design."' 151 Hence, protec-
tion as a trademark is warranted if consumers are motivated to
buy the product because of source-related reasons, but copying is
privileged if consumers are motivated to purchase the product
because of its appearance rather than because of its association
with a particular source.
The term "aesthetic functionality" would appear to be too
narrow if restricted purely to "aesthetics."'' 52 Indeed, the impor-
tant concept for Holmes and Hand would appear to be what was
in the public domain, rather than whether the product was a
zither or a wrench as compared to wearing apparel or dinnerware.
The intent of the Restatement does not appear to be so limiting
but, instead, gives an example of a feature which may affect "per-
formance" because of aesthetic value. Courts accepting the doc-
trine of aesthetic functionality do not appear to impose any
standard of beauty, objective or subjective.is 3
In contrast to utilitarian functionality, which may be deter-
mined on an objective factual basis, aesthetic functionality does
not lend itself to such a direct determination. The Restatement in-
dicates two approaches for determining whether a feature (admit-
tedly not a utilitarian functional one) still may affect the product's
performance and be functional within section 742. One approach
is motivational: whether consumer demand is based on the aes-
thetic value. The other approach is market-directed: whether
competition will be hindered by barring the copying. Neither of
these approaches presents the degree of certainty that may be ex-
pected with regard to utilitarian functionality, where the court
may, on the basis of documentary evidence and expert testimony,
draw a conclusion of fact as to whether the copied feature in ques-
tion has utility or serves user or maker efficiency.
Difficulty of proof alone, however, need not lead to the rejec-
tion of the entire doctrine of aesthetic functionality. In certain
151. Id.
152. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines "aesthetics" as "a branch
of philosophy dealing with the nature of the beautiful and with judgments con-
cerning beauty." WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 19 (1981).
153. See, e.g., Bliss v. Gotham Indus., 316 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1963) (plastic
pitcher); J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949 (8th Cir.
1941) (overall pocket); Deere & Co. v. Farmland, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.
Iowa 1982) (color of farm tractor accessory), aff'd per curiam, 721 F.2d 253 (8th
Cir. 1983); Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738 (D. Hawaii 1979)
(wavy shoe soles), aff'd, 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981).
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instances, there may be reasonably reliable evidence of either
consumer motivation, effect on competition, or both. One of
these instances would seem to be where consumers can normally
be expected to exercise a rational, cognitive process 54 in select-
ing a particular product primarily because of aesthetic (appear-
ance) reasons.
A. Cognitive Aesthetic Functionality
As illustrated in the Restatement and, generally, as applied by
those courts recognizing the doctrine of aesthetic functionality, a
presumption seems to be made that a cognitive decision-making
process is undertaken by consumers to purchase a particular
product because of its aesthetically pleasing characteristics. This
can be seen in the teapot hypothetical where a particular teapot
was purchased because of its aesthetic compatibility with the con-
sumer's existing dinnerware. The term "cognitive aesthetic func-
tionality" will be used here to describe products whose purchase
is motivated to satisfy a need for aesthetic compatibility in design,
color, shape, or style, and where the consumer exercises a cogni-
tive process in satisfying this need.
The leading case in the development of the doctrine of aes-
thetic functionality, Pagliero v. Wallace China Co. ,155 exemplifies the
cognitive form. In Pagliero, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in 1952 followed and, arguably, extended the
Restatement definition of functionality. The quotation of the fol-
lowing passage from Pagliero appears to be de rigeur for both the
originator and copier in product simulation cases:
"Functional" in this sense might be said to connote
other than a trade-mark purpose. If the particular fea-
ture is an important ingredient in the commercial suc-
cess of the product, the interest in free competition
permits its imitation in the absence of a patent or copy-
right. On the other hand, where the feature of, more
aptly, design is a mere arbitrary embellishment, a form
154. This is presumed to be the "normal" case on the basis of the factual
setting; however, it is, of course, possible that the purchase may be made irra-
tionally, e.g., "impulsively" or "emotionally". See infra notes 197-294 and ac-
companying text.
155. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952). See also Bliss v. Gotham Indus., 316 F.2d
848 (9th Cir. 1963) (copied plastic pitcher was found functional under Pagliero).
But cf Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High Fidelity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551 (9th
Cir. 1960) (phonograph record jacket was nonfunctional as trade dress; court
distinguished Pagliero on basis that record jacket was not part of product itself).
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of dress for goods primarily adopted for purposes of
identification and individuality, and hence, unrelated to
basic consumer demands in connection with the prod-
uct, imitation may be forbidden where the requisite
showing of secondary meaning is made. Under such cir-
cumstances, since effective competition may be under-
taken without imitation, the law grants protection. 56
The copier, of course, argues that the particular feature copied is
an important ingredient in its commercial success and that effec-
tive competition cannot be undertaken without that feature. On
the other hand, the originator of the product copied argues that it
is primarily an embellishment adopted solely for the purpose of
identifying and distinguishing its product from those of
competitors.
In Pagliero, the defendant had intentionally copied designs
used by the plaintiff on its china dinnerware.1 57 Based upon affi-
davits submitted by the plaintiff, the court found that "one of the
essential selling features of hotel china, if indeed, not the pri-
mary, is the design."' 58 The court thus concluded that purchas-
ers were motivated to buy the china not only for its utilitarian
function as china but also for its aesthetic value. Granting protec-
tion would therefore be anticompetitive.159 The motivation here
logically would involve a cognitive process. An important consid-
eration of hotel china would seem to be the compatibility of the
china with existing dinnerware and accessories, as well as the de-
cor of the hotel dining facilities. It seems unlikely that a signifi-
cant quantity of hotel china would be purchased as a result of
irrational behavior.
Under one interpretation, the language used in Pagliero
would seem to go beyond cognitive aesthetics to include any fea-
ture that was "an important ingredient in the commercial success
of the product." Most courts of appeals that have addressed the
issue have rejected this interpretation as being too broad, 60
156. 198 F.2d at 343. The Ninth Circuit has noted the tendency of the par-
ties to rely upon the different aspects of this passage. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J.
Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1981).
157. 198 F.2d at 340.
158. Id. at 343.
159. Id. at 344.
160. See, e.g., W.T. Rogers & Co., Inc. v. Keene, 228 U.S.P.O (BNA) 145
(7th Cir. 1985) (stacking office trays); Sicilia Di R. Biebouw & Co. v. Cox, 732
F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1984) (plastic citrus juice bottle); John H. Harland Co. v.
Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966 (11 th Cir. 1983) (commercial checkbook);
Farbrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983) (display folder
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although the Eighth Circuit, Second Circuit (for a short time),
and a number of district courts have adopted it.161 Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit itself has refused to hold as a matter of law that any
feature "which contributes to the consumer appeal and
saleability" is functional. 162 However, in the context of a case
where cognitive aesthetics would seemingly play a significant role
in motivating a consumer to make a particular purchase, the Sec-
ond Circuit recently applied the broad interpretation in Industria
Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, Ltd. 163
Charles Craig involved a sofa of modular design that was cop-
ied after the originator's design patent expired. 16 4 The court, af-
ter quoting the "important ingredient in the commercial success"
test, stated that the design need not be dissected to show func-
tionality and concluded that the overall design was functional.
The court stated: "This overall design makes the sofas attractive
to buyers despite enormously expensive price tags, and there is
no arbitrary embellishment or label which might be considered a
trademark."1 65
The acceptance of the sweeping "commercial success" for-
mulation of Charles Craig was, however, short-lived. In LeSportsac,
Inc. v. K-Mart Corp.,166 the Second Circuit, although stopping
short of outrightly rejecting this formulation, argued against its
for carpet samples); Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir.
1981) (commercial lighting fixture); Vuitton et Fils S.A. v.J. Young Enters., 644
F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981) (fabric design of luggage); In re DC Comics, Inc. 689
F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (in context of registration of comic book figures).
161. Prufrock Ltd., Inc. v. Lasater, 31 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) 252 (8th Cir. 1986) (restaurant interior design); Industria Arredamenti
Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, Ltd., 725 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1984) (sofa);
Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(jewelry design); Damn I'm Good, Inc. v. Hanover House Indus., 514 F. Supp.
1357, 1362 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (distinctive label attached to jewelry); Famolare,
Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738 (D. Hawaii 1979) (wavy soled shoes),
aff'd, 652 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1981).
162. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir.
1981). See also Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983)
(carpet display folder).
163. 725 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1984).
164. Id. at 18.
165. Id. at 20 (footnote omitted). In, perhaps, an overly broad interpreta-
tion of Charles Craig, the Southern District of New York applied the "commercial
success" test to an orange juice squeezer, where one could only surmise that
cognitive aesthetics would play a significant role in consumer motivation. Metro
Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Rowaco, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 273, (S.D.N.Y. 1985). See also
Morex S.P.A. v. Design Institute of Am., Inc., - F. Supp. -, (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(applying "commercial success" formulation of Charles Craig to copied etagre),
rev'd, 31 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 184 (1986).
166. 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985).
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overly inclusive application, because the "[t]rade dress associated
with a product that has accumulated goodwill ... will almost al-
ways be 'an important ingredient' in the 'saleability' of the prod-
uct" and denying protection would be a disincentive to the
creation of attractive designs.' 67 The granting of a preliminary
injunction against the simultation of LeSportsac's line of light-
weight luggage bags was affirmed on the ground, inter alia, that a
finding of nonfunctionality was not clearly erroneous. 68
The court did not, however, reject the doctrine of aesthetic
functionality, for it concluded that the trial judge should answer
the question: "Are consumers likely to purchase a LeSportsac
bag rather than that of a competitor principally because they find
LeSportsac's particular combination of design features aestheti-
cally pleasing, or will they buy principally because the product
features service to identify or distinguish the goods as genuine
LeSportsac Products?"' 69 The court thus recognized that aes-
thetic considerations may, at least in part, create demand for such
bags, but would not foreclose protection against copying unless
appearance was the principal motivation for purchase.
Importantly, the court in LeSportsac also concluded that in an
action under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, functionality was a
defense; hence, the burden was on the copier to prove that the
copied product was functional. Although not at issue in the case,
if functionality were to be treated as a defense by implication, the
copier would have the burden of proving not only aesthetic func-
tionality but also utilitarian functionality.1 70
The CCPA (now CAFC) has rejected the doctrine of aesthetic
functionality as a ground for refusing the registration of a three-
dimensional product. The latest review of the doctrine was in In
re DC Comics, Inc.,171 involving the registration of a two-dimen-
sional rendition of comic book characters (Superman, Batman,
Joker) as the trademark for three-dimensional toy dolls of the
167. Id. at 77. Most recently the Second Circuit, in a per curiam decision,
noted that LeSportsac impliedly rejected the Charles Craig "commercial success"
standard. Morex S.P.A. v. Design Institute of American, Inc., 31 PAT. TRADE-
MARK & COPYRIGHTJ. (BNA) 184, 185 (1986).
168. 754 F.2d at 78.
169. Id.
170. If that is the case, this would be inconsistent with the common law tort
of "unprivileged imitation" as set forth in RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 741 (1938).
See supra note 48. See also Judge Learned Hand's approach, supra text accompa-
nying notes 112-24. For a discussion advocating the rejection of placing the
burden on the copier to prove utilitarian functionality, see infra note 346.
171. 689 F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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same characters. 72 The CCPA rejected the broad "commercial
success" test of Pagliero and concluded that the two-dimensional
rendition was nonfunctional in the utilitarian sense. 73
Judge Rich concurred in the result, observing: "With respect
to the notion that a design is aesthetically functional if it is 'an
important ingredient in the commercial success of the product,' it
is noted that many trademarks hold such a place . . . ."174 More-
over, his analysis of the cases led him to conclude: "Thus, it is
arguable that there is no 'doctrine' of aesthetic functionality
which stands alone, without consideration of the more traditional
source identification principles of trademark law." 175 Yet, in
terms of consumer motivation, this presumes that consumers
purchase comic book character dolls because of the source of
those dolls rather than because of the appearance of those dolls
as cognitively assessed or because of "affective" or "symbolic"
appeal of those characters. As will be considered below, the sym-
bolic appeal-in the sense of a need to show affiliation with those
characters-could well play a significant role in the demand for
such dolls.176
In Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp.,177 involving
unfair competition under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the
Eighth Circuit quoted with approval the Pagliero formulation of
functional and nonfunctional features. 78 The court then, how-
ever, affirmed the district court's finding that the copied features
of a semi-trailer were nonfunctional on the basis of utilitarian
considerations alone.179 The court concluded that "[t]he prohibi-
tion against the copying of [the features in question] will not af-
fect [the copier's] competitive position in the marketplace."'' 80
In Truck Equipment, this conclusion may logically be justified,
for there seems little likelihood that consumers would be moti-
vated to purchase a semi-trailer on the basis of its appearance.
Using the words of Judge Learned Hand in Champion Spark Plug
and substituting "semi-trailer" for "spark-plug," this would be
172. Id. at 1043.
173. Id. at 1045.
174. Id. at 1049.
175. Id. at 1050.
176. For a further discussion of the emotional basis of consumer behavior,
see infra notes 224-59 and accompanying text.
177. 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
178. 536 F.2d at 1217-18 (quoting Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d
339, 343 (9th Cir 1952)).
179. Id. at 1218.
180. Id.
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"because a buyer will not choose a [semi-trailer] because its ap-
pearance pleases his fancy."8 s
The presumption-at least a conclusive one-that the con-
sumer is only interested in the utilitarian functionality of a prod-
uct, however, may not always be warranted, even in cases
involving heavy equipment. For example, in Deere & Co. v. Farm-
hand, Inc.,182 the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from
copying a piece of farm equipment called a front-end loader. 8 3
The defendant had copied the loader, including the plaintiff's
distinctive "John Deere green" color, which was used on all of the
plaintiff's farm machinery. 84 The United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa analyzed the features copied and
found the design to be utilitarian functional, because alternative
designs "would have sacrificed function, cost or appearance con-
siderations."' 85 With regard to appearance, the court refused to
enjoin the use of the same color, for it found, as a matter of fact,
that farmers desired to match the color of the loader with that of
their tractors. 8 6 This finding was based upon statements by the
plaintiff's employees, dealers and farmers. 87 Interestingly, the
Deere court also found, as a fact, that no farmer would purchase a
front-end loader on impulse or based upon color alone.' 88
Thus, it is clear that the court believed cognitive-in the
matching of colors-was involved. Hence, the court drew the
legal conclusion that the color was aesthetically functional, for
competitors would be hindered in selling such loaders if barred
from using the color desired by farmers.' 8 9 Although there ap-
peared to be no direct finding that the defendant could not effec-
tively compete without painting its equipment "John Deere
green," the court took special note of the plaintiff's assertion that
the defendant was better able to compete by using that color.' 90
181. See 233 F. 112, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). On the other hand, consumers
may perceive certain status value to be associated with the ownership of a semi-
trailer of a certain appearance. For a further discussion of aesthetic appeal in
consumer purchasing, see infra notes 284-304 and accompanying text.
182. 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982), aff'd per curiam, 721 F.2d 253 (8th
Cir. 1983).
183. 560 F. Supp. at 88.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 91.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 92.
189. Id. at 98.
190. Id.
[Vol. 3 1: p. 1
40
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss1/1
CONSUMER MOTIVATION AND TRADEMARKS
Another recent example of cognitive aesthetic functionality is
found in the Third Circuit case of Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus-
tries.19' In Keene, the court refused to adopt the broad Pagliero
"important ingredient in the commercial success" standard and
instead stated that the "inquiry should focus on the extent to
which the design feature is related to the utilitarian function of
the product or feature."' 92 On this basis the Third Circuit af-
firmed the district court's finding of aesthetic functionality with
regard to the copied wall-mounted luminaire, because "part of its
function includes its architectural compatibility with the structure
or building on which it is mounted."' 193 The finding that architec-
tural compatibility was needed by consumers was based upon ad-
vertising brochures, including those of the plaintiff, and the
testimony of engineers and architects and an officer of defendant
corporation. 94 The conclusion that competition would be hin-
dered if copying were to be enjoined was supported by the fact
that there was a limited number of alternative designs available
that would satisfy the need for architectural compatibility. 95
The Keene court's definition of aesthetic functionality may be
contrasted with the Fifth Circuit's narrow definition of functional-
ity in Sicilia. The definition in Sicilia would appear only to permit
consideration of alternatives on the basis of "superiority" in
terms of utility, or user or maker efficiency.' 96
In sum, although the cases of cognitive aesthetic functionality
can not be decided on the same objective basis as those involving
utilitarian functionality, admissions by a plaintiff (in advertising or
otherwise) coupled with evidence of consumer motivation and
market conditions, often give objective assurances as to the com-
petitive necessity to privilege copying.
191. 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981). In Keene, the copied product was an exte-
rior wall-mounted lamp used on commercial buildings. Id. at 823.
192. Id. at 825.
193. Id. at 826.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 827.
196. 732 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1984). In Sicilia the defendant had marketed
citrus juice in a plastic bottle similar in shape and color to the plaintiff's product.
The court in Sicilia seemed to admit that in Keene there were limited design op-
tions but that such options were essentially unlimited with respect to the copied
bottle at issue. Id. at 428. Of course, the design options available for wall-
mounted lamps are considerably diminished if the inquiry is limited to "superi-
ority" in utilitarian considerations.
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B. Affective Functionality-Impulse Buying
Purchases of products by consumers are not always the result
of a rational process involving cognition by consumers, 197 moti-
vated to satisfy utilitarian needs or even cognitive aesthetic needs.
Consumer research indicates that a significant amount of
purchases are "impulse" purchases. 98 Such buying behavior is
irrational and appears to be primarily based upon the "affective"
or "hedonistic" appeal of the product itself. 199 Such appeal is pri-
marily associated with characteristics of the product that appeal to
the senses of the consumer rather than to reason. 200 Advertising
that appeals to the senses seeks to exploit this type of irrational
197. See supra note 7. Professor Woods has identified two types of irrational
consumer behavior:
The cognitive-habit dimension does not explain all purchasing be-
havior. Purchasing decisions may be made on the basis of other forces.
Two such types of behavior may be identified: behavior in response to
affective appeal and behavior in response to symbolic appeal. Although
these behavior types are often loosely grouped together as "irrational,"
they do differ.
Woods, supra note 13, at 33 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). "Affec-
tive" appeal or value will be considered in this section, and "symbolic" appeal or
value in the next.
198. Four types of impulse buying have been suggested:
1. Pure impulse buying. The "novelty or escape purchase which
breaks a normal buying pattern."
2. Reminder impulse buying. "A shopper sees an item and remem-
bers that the stock at home is exhausted or low, or recalls an advertise-
ment or other information about the item and a previous decision to
buy."
3. Suggestion impulse buying. A shopper sees a product for the first
time and visualizes a need for it, even though he or she has no previous
knowledge of the item....
4. Planned impulse buying. "The shopper enters the store with
some specific purchases in mind, but with the expectation and intention
to make other purchases that depend on price specials, coupon offers
and the like."
F. REYNOLDS & W. WELLS, supra note 2, at 345. These authors conclude that
studies show that American homemakers are:
increasingly transferring their purchase planning from the home to the
store, entering the store with a general set of expectations but making a
great number of the actual buying decisions at the point of purchase.
Studies of this kind have sometimes been interpreted as showing that
consumers are becoming less rational in their decision making-that
instead of being guided by the intrinsic merits of the products, the
modern American consumer is frequently trapped into bad decisions by
such superficial lures as attractive packaging and inviting displays.
Id. at 345-46.
199. For a further discussion of the affective appeal of products, see supra
note 13. See also Woods, supra note 13, at 33-36.
200. Hence, the shade, color, texture, smell, feel, and even the sound of a
product (e.g., the effervescence of a carbonated soft drink) may play a part in the
consumer's selection process. See supra note 13.
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behavior in emphasizing the sensual characteristics associated
with the product rather than its utilitarian function. 20 1
Often it would appear that the consumer does have at least a
nominal utilitarian need for the product in question, but in dis-
criminating among products, the one that has the highest affec-
tive (hedonistic) appeal is selected over others, even though other
products serve the same utilitarian function and may be more
cost-efficient. In the teapot example, the purchaser may select a
teapot of a particular color or style over a less expensive and
more durable model. In certain instances, impulse buying may
occur without even a nominal utilitarian need for a product-
where the product has so great an affective appeal on a given con-
sumer that it is purchased regardless of any need for its utilitarian
function. Hence, a particular teapot is purchased because the
consumer attempts to satisfy an irrational need for a product of a
particular color or style even though he or she already has one or
more teapots.
The more broadly based the affective appeal of a particular
product, the greater demand it will have in the marketplace.
Thus, from a marketing standpoint it becomes highly desirable to
design a product having a substantially universal affective appeal
rather than having only limited idiosyncratic appeal. This may, of
course, be affected greatly by custom, affiliation, trends, fashion,
socialization, etc., which may lead to the acquisition of certain
products because of the symbolic value of certain colors, designs,
styles, etc., as will be considered below.202
The appearance or other sensual characteristics of products
having affective functionality may be seen as having "tertiary"
meaning to the consumer, that is, a separate meaning in addition
to its primary meaning as indicative of the product itself and its
possible secondary meaning as a product associated with a single
source. As in the cases of utilitarian functionality and cognitive
aesthetic functionality, it would appear that the source of a partic-
ular product with affective appeal, which results in an impulse
purchase, would be relatively unimportant, if not irrelevant, to
the consumer. If it is, indeed, the product itself which motivates
its purchase in order to satisfy an irrational need, a basic question
is raised as to the proper balance between "free" and "fair" com-
201. The Chanel "live your fantasy" advertisements would seem to be a
vivid example of this.
202. For a complete discussion of the relationship between symbolic func-
tionality and emotional buying, see infra notes 220-94 and accompanying text.
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petition. Should the creator of a product with affective appeal
and which is associated with a single source be rewarded with a
monopoly in that particular product, or, in the converse, should
the affective appeal of that product (just as its utilitarian and aes-
thetic value) be deemed to be in the public domain, free for any-
one to copy? Further, should an incentive be provided for the
creation of a product design satisfying an irrational need in the
absence of source motivation?
If protection is granted, it would appear to be on an appro-
priation/entitlement basis. Essentially, the affective appeal of the
product-its "tertiary" meaning-would be treated as property,
which then, by reason of its property status, would give its creator
standing to assert exclusive rights in that appeal. Its exclusivity
presumably would be recognized upon proof of source associa-
tion and likelihood of confusion.
It is difficult to isolate cases involving affective functionality
from cases involving products that may also involve cognitive aes-
thetic functionality, as discussed above, or symbolic functionality,
as discussed below. Of course, in most, if not all instances, these
arbitrary classifications may overlap and constantly change as
need patterns change.
One case that could be categorized as involving affective
functionality is Cheney Brothers v. Doris Silk Corp.20 3 In Cheney,
Judge Hand asserted that the patterns on silk are "designed to
attract purchasers by their novelty and beauty. Most of these fail
in that purpose, so that not much more than a fifth catch the pub-
lic fancy." 204 The affective appeal of the product itself would be
seen to induce an impulse purchase. Protection against copying
was denied in Cheney, with Judge Hand refusing to extend Interna-
tional News Service v. Associated Press to such designs on an "appro-
priation" basis.20 5
A recent example of the potential involvement of affective
functionality was the Third Circuit case of Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral
Wine & Liquor Co. 206 In Freixenet, the defendant argued that it sold
wine in a "frosted black bottle because of 'the feelings and im-
pressions' of elegance and sophistication that black evokes in a
purchaser of liquor.' "207 The finding that the black bottle was
203. 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930).
204. 35 F.2d at 279.
205. Id. at 280-81 (citing International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215 (1918)).
206. 731 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1984).
207. Id. at 150.
[Vol. 3 1: p. I
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nonfunctional was not appealed, however, as the defendant pre-
vailed on other grounds.20 8
A more prosaic example of affective functionality may be
found in Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc. ,209 where the
Second Circuit refused to enjoin the copying of the pink color of
the stomach medication "Pepto-Bismol. 2 10 In Norwich, the court
rejected the trial court's conclusion, based on a narrow definition
of functionality, that the pink color had no functional value be-
cause it had no healing value, in light of the recognition that the
pink color was designed to present a pleasing appearance to the
suffering consumer.2 1' The appellate court, in a footnote, consid-
ered it unnecessary to decide whether the pink color may have
had some psychosomatic effect and hence would have had thera-
peutic value. 212 Yet the court seemed to presume that the medi-
cation's pink color had some value to the consumer.213
Closely related and probably involving an overlap of affective
208. Id. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a prelimi-
nary injunction because the finding of no likelihood of confusion was not clearly
erroneous, Id. at 152. The court also dismissed an appeal from a grant of par-
tial summary judgment against the plaintiff that it could not acquire a monopoly
on the use of a black bottle. Id. at 153. See also Freixenet, S.A. v. Frank Hartley,
Inc., No. 82-1095, slip op. (D. Mass. Aug. 26, 1982); Freixenet, S.A. v. Jose
Freixedas, No. 82-1601, slip op. (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1982) (granting preliminary
injunctions against competing sellers of sparkling Spanish wine in frosted black
bottles).
209. 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919 (1960).
210. 271 F.2d at 573.
211. Id. at 572.
212. Id. at 572 n.7.
213. The conclusion that the color pink presents a pleasing appearance to
those with upset stomachs may be contrary to psyhological research on color.
As stated in a recent study:
But the view that pink induces tranquility is contradicted by a consist-
ently recurrent theme in the literature on the psychology of color-
namely, the association of hues at the warm or long end of the visible
spectrum (red, orange, pink) with excitation and emotional arousal,
and those toward the cool or short end (green, blue, violet) with calm
and relaxation.
Pellegrini, Schauss & Miller, Room Color and Aggression in a Criminal Detention Hold-
ing Cell: A Test of the 'Tranquilizing Pink' Hypothesis, 10J. ORTHOMOLECULAR PSYCHI-
ATRY 174, 175 (1981). One commentator describes the psychological effect of
colors in the red range as follows:
Psychologically, red is exciting and increases restlessness and ner-
vous tension....
Modified forms of red-rose, maroon, pink-are beautiful and ex-
pressive, universally appealing, and deeply emotional. Variations of
red are preferred by extroverts; therefore the color has a place in psy-
chotherapy to bolster human moods and counteract melancholia. It
helps to distract attention from within and to direct it outward.
F. BIRREN, COLOR PSYCHOLOGY & COLOR THERAPY 258 (1961).
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and cognitive aesthetic functionality is the trademark and unfair
competition doctrine of "mere ornamentation," which denies
protection to those product features that are merely ornamental
and hence not indicative of source. An example of this was the
denial of protection to stripes on luggage in Ventura Travelware,
Inc. v. Baltimore Luggage Co. 2 14 In Ventura, the court stated: "When
a customer selects an item because its style or attractiveness is
enhanced by ornamentation and decorative symbols the function
of the decoration may hardly be regarded as a mark indicating
source or origin." 21 5 It is not apparent on what factual basis the
court concluded that customers would be motivated to purchase
luggage because of its ornamentation and decorative symbols
rather than because of its source. The court, however, was appar-
ently convinced that such symbols contributed materially to the
general sale of the luggage.
Mere ornamentation is a long recognized ground for re-
jecting the registration of a trademark, originally as an absolute
ground for rejection,2 16 but later as a rebuttable ground upon
proof of secondary meaning. 217 There would, however, still ap-
pear to be cases where particular ornamentation would be found
inherently (de jure) ornamental and hence incapable of being
source-indicating. Such inherent ornamentation is alluded to in
In re Penthouse International, Ltd. ,218 where the CCPA asserted the
blanket rule: "Jewelry designs as such are not registrable." 21 9
Although the court cited no authority for this proposition, it evi-
dently had in mind the concept of an inherently ornamental de-
sign for which proof of de facto secondary meaning would not be
recognized. If such is the case, it would be argued that the court
was recognizing some form of nonutilitarian functionality.
In sum, affective functionality may be viewed as the irrational
complement to cognitive aesthetic functionality. In both in-
214. 66 Misc. 2d 646, 322 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 38 A.D.2d
794, 328 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1972). But cf. LeSportsac, Inc. v. Dockside Research,
Inc., 478 F. Supp. 602, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (design elements of travel bag in-
tended to give particular "look" could warrant trademark protection, particu-
larly when alternative designs were available in marketplace).
215. 66 Misc. 2d at 650, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
216. See In re Burgess Co., 112 F.2d 820 (C.C.P.A. 1940) (holding that
stripe design on battery casing is not registrable as trademark).
217. See In re Swift & Co., 223 F,2d 950 (C.C.P.A. 1955) (holding that red
and white polka dot design on cleanser container is capable of being registered
as trademark).
218. 565 F.2d 679 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
219. Id. at 682.
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stances, the consumer is primarily motivated to purchase the
product because of product-centered characteristics of a nonu-
tilitarian nature. If the consumer is using a cognitive process to
make the purchase on the basis of the product's appearance, e.g.,
its compatibility, it then would be, in the suggested categoriza-
tion, cognitive aesthetic functionality. However, if the consumer
is not conscious of the reason for the desirability of the product
but reacts to the product in an impulsive manner because of its
affective (hedonistic) appeal, then this would be categorized as af-
fective functionality. In either instance, the source of the product
does not appear to be a prime concern. It is the product itself
and its appearance as either consciously or unconsciously appre-
ciated that would appear to govern the transaction. Of course,
the problem still remains one of being able to ascertain whether
the consumer is acting in response to the affective appeal of a
product to buy it impulsively.
C. Symbolic Functionality-Emotional Buying
A consumer may purchase a product primarily to satisfy an
emotional need for what the product represents rather than what
it does or how it appears. 220 The product may then be said to
have "symbolic value" to the consumer, who perceives its acquisi-
tion as a means of satisfying a particular ego need. The ego in-
volvement with the product is that it symbolizes a desired self-
image of the consumer. 22' The consumer is driven to the emo-
tional purchase of this product in an attempt to satisfy an ego-
centered need, such as a need for "affiliation" with someone or
something (a teapot bearing a Chicago Bears222 emblem); for the
"status" perceived to be associated with certain products or
brands (a Wedgwood teapot); or perhaps for a direct expression
of the consumer's desired self-image (a teapot inscribed "Lovers
220. Professor Levy observed that "Itfhe things people buy are seen to
have personal and social meaning, in addition to their functions. Modem goods
are recognized as psychological things, as symbolic of personal attributes and
goals, as symbolic of social patterns and strivings." Levy, supra note 16, at 59.
221. Professor Levy concluded:
[The symbolic] product will be used and enjoyed when it joins with,
meshes with, adds to, reinforces, the way the consumer thinks about
himself. In the broadest sense, each person aims to enhance his sense
of self, to behave in ways that are consistent with a set of ideas he has
about the kind of person he is or wants to be.
Id. at 59.
222. The reader may, of course, substitute his or her favorite team for
"Chicago Bears."
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prefer tea"). 223 Hence, a product having symbolic functionality
provides the consumer with external evidence of the consumer's
self-image, and, as in the case of products having affective func-
tionality, those with symbolic functionality may be said to have a
"tertiary" meaning (symbolic) to consumers beyond primary
meaning (utilitarian) and secondary meaning (source association).
Perhaps the clearest example of consumer motivation to ac-
quire a product on an emotional buying basis is the purchase of
products bearing the emblem 22 4 of organizations, teams, schools,
etc., with which the consumer wishes to show affiliation. It seems
reasonably certain in such cases that the purchase of the product
is primarily for satisfaction of a need for affiliation rather than
primarily for utilitarian or aesthetic reasons. In cases involving
such emblems, the courts generally have recognized the symbolic
value of the emblems in question.225 However, the courts gener-
ally have avoided directly addressing the issue of whether the
symbolic value should be in the public domain along with ut-
litarian value, as generally agreed, or with aesthetic value, as
sometimes agreed. In most cases, the primary issue addressed
has been whether there is likelihood of confusion in the sense that
consumers "believe" or "think" that the product bearing the em-
blem originated from or was sponsored by the source indicated
by the emblem. The association of the emblem with its source has
not been in dispute and the question has been one of association
of the product with the source of the emblem. A brief review of
representative cases on this issue may be useful.
In Adolph Kastor & Brothers v. Federal Trade Commission,226 the
223. Other categories and categorizations of ego-centered needs may be
suggested. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 16, at 60-64; Woods, supra note 13, at 33.
Because the case law suggests the needs of affiliation, status, and direct expres-
sion, they have been selected for analysis.
224. For simplicity, "emblem" will be used herein to indicate the generic
class of names, emblems, logos, symbols, indicia, etc.
225. See Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry
Co., 676 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1982) (defendant's use of Rainbow mark created no
confusion or mistake among purchasers as to source of origin); International
Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir.)
(Job's Daughters organization failed to show that consumers purchasing unoffi-
cial jewelry would think it was produced, sponsored, or endowed by the organi-
zation), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); Boston Professional Hockey Assoc. v.
Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1011 (5th Cir.) (professional
hockey team has interest in its own individual symbol and is entitled to legal
protection against unauthorized use), cert. dneied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). For a
further discussion of Rainbow Girls, Job's Daughters, and Boston Hockey, see infra
notes 233-55 and accompanying text.
226. 138 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1943). The Kastor Company and its predeces-
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Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Hand, upheld the Com-
mission's order enjoining the use of the words "Scout," "Boy
Scout" or "Scouting" on pocket knives marketed by Kastor.227
Judge Hand stated: "At the outset we hold therefore that the
word, 'Scout,' when applied to a boy's pocket knife, suggests, if
indeed it does not actually indicate, that the knife is in some way
sponsored by the Boy Scouts of America." 22 8 Even though, as
indicated, the suggestion of sponsorship may have been vague,
such suggestion justified the Commission's injunction as a matter
of law.229 Judge Hand, however, went further to apply a trade-
mark analysis (balancing the hardship of the infringer to forebear
against damage to the owner of the mark if infringement per-
sisted) to further justify the injunction. 230 He concluded that "[ilt
is not even necessary that the label read 'boy scouts' to buy Kas-
tor knives supposing that they are 'Official Knives'; boys who are
not 'Scouts' may be lead to buy them because in their minds they
vaguely have the imprimatur of the Boy Scouts of America." 23'
This would seem to implicitly recognize the symbolic value of the
word "Scout" on the knives, presumably because "official knives"
were desired to evidence affiliation with the Boy Scouts of
America.232
In Boston Professional Hockey Association v. Dallas Cap & Emblem
Manufacturing, Inc.,233 the Fifth Circuit recognized that the pri-
mary market for patches bearing the emblems of professional
hockey teams was the desire "among ice hockey fans . . . to
purchase emblems embroidered with the symbols of their favorite
teams" to enable those fans "to show public allegiance to or iden-
tification with the teams themselves." 234 The court deemed the
sor had produced cutlery since 1879. Id. at 824. The company sold knives
marked "Scout" for the Boy Scouts of America. Id. at 825.
227. Id. at 825.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. In addition to whatever symbolic value "official" knives had, it could
also be perceived by consumers that official knives were of a higher quality than
"unofficial" ones. Indeed, sponsorship seemingly would impose a duty of qual-
ity control. See Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982) (definition of "related
company"); see also 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 18-
13 to -17 (1973 & Supp. 1982).
233. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). In Boston
Hockey, the hockey league and member teams sought to enjoin an emblem manu-
facturer from making and selling embroidered cloth emblems embodying the
teams' registered trade and service marks. 510 F.2d at 1009.
234. 510 F.2d at 1011.
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principal issue for resolution to be one of trademark infringe-
ment: "The certain knowledge of the buyer that the source and
the origin of the trademark symbols were in plaintiffs satisfies the
[likelihood of confusion] requirement of the [Lanham] act." 235
The normal requirement of confusion of source of the product
would thus not be imposed "where the trademark, originated by
the team, is the triggering mechanism for the sale of the em-
blem." 236 The Fifth Circuit, therefore, appears to have presumed
product source association, at least in the sense of sponsorship of
the product on a showing of emblem source identification. Such
a broad interpretation would seemingly give in rem protection to
team emblems used on any product.
The Boston Hockey court distinguished Pagliero v. Wallace China
Co. 237 on the ground that "the embroidered symbols are sold not
because of any such aesthetic characteristic but because they are
the trademarks of the hockey teams.1238 The court thus seemed
to recognize that the primary motivation of consumers to
purchase the patches was not the aesthetic value of the hockey
team emblem, but rather their emotional need to show affiliation
with the hockey teams. In the normal trademark sense, a con-
sumer's purchase of a product by trademark implies that the con-
sumer is motivated because of source-related qualities associated
235. Id. at 1012. The court used the term "trademark," while all of the
teams except the Canadian one had United States registration of their emblems
as service marks. The question would appear to be whether defendant's use
infringed their registered service marks. An alternative gound would be § 43(a)
of the Lanham Act as invoked in Boston Hockey with respect to the unregistered
emblem. Id.
236. Id. Cf National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Consumer Enters.,
26 I11. App. 3d 814, 819, 327 N.E.2d 242, 247 (1975) (court recognized orna-
mental value of emblems but concluded "that the trademarks [sic] of the teams
copied by defendant indicate sponsorship or origin in addition to their orna-
mental value"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
237. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952). In Pagliero, the Wallace China Company
developed four distinct china patterns, created a substantial market for its prod-
ucts, and acquired an excellent reputation in the hotel china industry. Id. at 340.
The Pagliero brothers used Wallace's plate designs and design names. Id. The
names were not registered trademarks, nor were the designs patented or copy-
righted. Id. at 341. The court held that the designs were functional and there-
fore not protectable. Id. at 343. For a further discussion of Pagliero, see supra
notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
238. 510 F.2d at 1013 (citing Pagliero, 198 F.2d 339). The Boston Hockey
court stated that the embroidered symbols sold because they were the teams'
trademarks, as contrasted with the china, which sold because of its attractiveness
and eye-appeal. Id. Products that consumers demand, regardless of their source
of origin, are distinguishable from products in cases in which the design or sym-
bol has no value other than its significance as a trademark. Id.
[Vol. 3 1: p. I
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with the product bearing the trademark and not because of the
affilation-related qualities of the emblem itself.
The Fifth Circuit has since rejected the in rem protection in-
terpretation of Boston Hockey in Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow
Girls v. J.H. Jewelry Co. 2 39 In Rainbow Girls, the court refused to
enjoin the unauthorized use of the Rainbow Girls emblem onjew-
elry on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove likelihood
of confusion as to source or sponsorship.2 40 The court distin-
guished Boston Hockey on a factual basis, contrasting the practices
of professional teams and fraternal organizations in controlling
the use of their emblems. 24'
The Second Circuit followed Boston Hockey in adopting an
emblem confusion standard in Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc., v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd. ,242 in which the court enjoined the unauthor-
ized use of copies of the Dallas Cowboy cheerleading uniforms in
the "defendants' sexually depraved film." 2 43 In accordance with
Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, the Second Circuit, in Warner Brothers,
Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc. ,244 enjoined the copying of a toy car (the
"General Lee") modeled after one used in the television series,
239. 676 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1982).
240. The court held that there was no historical custom or practice as to
fraternal jewelry or Rainbow jewelry which provided a reasonable basis for con-
sumers to assume Rainbow jewelry could only be manufactured with Rainbow's
sponsorship or approval. Id. at 1083. Secondly, Rainbow's "official jewelry"
was well known and the letter "S" on the official jewelry created the "ines-
capable inference... that all other Rainbow jewelry is not endorsed, sponsored,
approved or otherwise associated with Rainbow." Id.
241. Id. at 1083 (citing Boston Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1013). The'court stated:
"[M]ost fraternal associations exercise little control over the manufacture ofjew-
elry bearing their fraternal emblems . I..." d.
242. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir 1979). Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders objected to
Pussycat Cinema's distribution and exhibition of a sexually explicit movie involv-
ing cheerleaders performing sexual services for a fee to raise money to travel to
Dallas. Id. at 202-03. Debbie, the movie's "star," wore a uniform strikingly simi-
lar to those of the Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders while engaging in various sex
acts. Id. at 203.
243. Id. at 205. The Dallas Cowboys court held that the characteristics of the
cheerleading outfit were not precluded from being designated as a trademark
because they also served a functional purpose. Id. at 203. The "combination of
the white boots, white shorts, blue blouse, and white star-studded vest and belt
is an arbitrary design which makes the otherwise functional uniform trademark-
able". Id. at 204. The court felt that after viewing the film, it would be difficult
to disassociate it from the Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders. Id. at 205.
244. 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981). Gay Toys unsuccessfully sought a license
to produce a toy car utilizing the distinctive features of "The Dukes of Hazzard"
car, "General Lee." Id. at 78. However, Gay Toys proceeded to manufacture
and distribute a toy called the "Dixie Racer" in an attempt to exploit the market
created by "The Dukes of Hazzard" television show. Id.
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"The Dukes of Hazard." 245 The case was disposed of on the like-
lihood of confusion issue, which was deemed resolvable on the
basis of "public belief" that the car produced by the defendant
had been sponsored or otherwise approved by the plaintiff.2 46
The district court and the court of appeals both recognized that
the symbolic value of the car played a significant role in its sale:
"The District Court properly inferred that many children buy the
car (or induce their parents to buy it for them) as a prop for play
in which they pretend they are the 'Duke Boys' of television
fame." 247 The court clearly protected the symbolic value of the
"General Lee" as a trademark on the basis of consumer belief of
sponsorship even though, as the district court found, purchasers
of the car were not concerned about who made it or who may
have sponsored it.248
The CCPA, in In re Penthouse International Ltd. ,249 seemed to
recognize the symbolic value of a "stylized key logo" as a trade-
mark for jewelry. The court approved its registration, and stated
that "it cannot be said that sales can result only from the attrac-
tiveness of the jewelry item, and that sales would not be triggered
by recognition of the mark".2 50 Although the Penthouse emblem
in the form of a key may have some aesthetic appeal as jewelry, it
appears far more likely that its primary appeal is an emotional
need to show affiliation with Penthouse rather than the source-
related qualities of the key.
In contrast to the foregoing, at least two cases would seem to
treat the symbolic value of a product as aesthetically functional,
and, hence, in the public domain. In International Order of Job's
245. The "Dixie Racer" is identical to the orange, 1969 Dodge Charger
with a Confederate flag emblem on it, as seen on the "Dukes of Hazzard," ex-
cept that its door decal numerals are reversed from "01" to "10." Id. at 78.
246. The court held that Gay Toys deliberately utilized the distinctive fea-
tures in order to divert business and increase its sales by misleading consumers
as to the source of the "Dixie Racer". Id.
247. Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
248. Id. at 78. See also Bi-Rite Enters., v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (emblems of rock music groups are protectable upon proof of
likelihood of confusion as to source or sponsorship). The Seventh Circuit, in a
case that also involved the sale of a toy model of the "General Lee" car, followed
Warner Brothers. Processed Plastics Co. v. Warner Communications, 675 F.2d
852 (7th Cir. 1982).
249. 565 F.2d 679 (C.C.P.A. 1977). In Penthouse, Penthouse sought to reg-
ister its established emblem as a jewelry design.
250. Id. at 683. Furthermore, the court noted that "[t]he capacity of a mark
to indicate origin is not destroyed because the mark appears as a charm on a
bracelet, instead of as a symbol on the box which contains the bracelet." Id.
[Vol. 3 1: p. I
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Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co. ,251 the Ninth Circuit refused to enjoin
the unauthorized use of the name and emblem of a fraternal or-
ganization on jewelry because they were "functional aesthetic
components of the jewelry, in that they [were] being mer-
chandized on the basis of their intrinsic value, not as a designa-
tion of origin or sponsorship. '" 2 52 The court recognized the
symbolic value of the emblem, stating: "We commonly identify
ourselves by displaying emblems expressing allegiances." 253
To avoid denying protection on functional grounds, the
court apparently would require that the consumer be motivated
to purchase the product because of its source or because of spon-
sorship by that source: "It would be naive to conclude that the
name or emblem is desired because consumers believe that the
product somehow originated with or was sponsored by the organ-
ization the name or emblem signifies." 254 The decision is , how-
ever, ambiguous on this point, because the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the plaintiff "did not meet its burden of proving
that a typical buyer.., would think that the jewelry was produced,
sponsored, or endorsed by the organization." 25 5 If mere con-
sumer belief as to source or sponsorship would warrant protec-
251. 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981). Sym-
bolic value could also be seen as protected by the registration of the two-dimen-
sional representations of comic book characters (Superman, Batman, Joker) as
the trademarks for the dolls representing those characters. In re DC Comics,
Inc., 689 F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982). For a further discussion of DC Comics, see
infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
252. 633 F.2d at 918 (applying the Pagliero distinction discussed supra, at
notes 237-38).
253. Id. The court in Job's Daughter further stated: "Our jewelry, clothing,
and cars are emblazoned with inscriptions showing the organizations we belong
to, the schools we attend, the landmarks we have visited, the sports teams we
support, the beverage we imbibe." Id.
254. Id. (emphaiss added).
255. Id. at 920 (emphasis added). Earlier in its decision the court added to
the confusion by stating:
Our holding does not mean that a name or emblem could not serve
simultaneously as a functional component of a product and a trade-
mark. That is, even if the Job's Daughters' name and emblem, when
inscribed on Lindeburg's jewelry, served primarily a functional pur-
pose, it is possible that they could serve secondarily as trademarks if the
typical customer not only purchased the jewelry for its intrinsic func-
tional use and aesthetic appeal but also inferred from the insignia that
thejewelry was produced, sponsored, or endorsed by Job's Daughters.
Id. at 919 (citations omitted). The United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington interpreted this passage as justifying protection upon
proof of secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion in an emblem case. Na-
tional Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F.
Supp. 651, 663 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
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tion of the emblem, this would destroy aesthetic functionality as
an independent ground for denying protection.
Further, in University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc. ,256
the United States District Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania recognized the symbolic value of the University of Pitts-
burgh's emblem and refused to enjoin its use.2 57 The court
found as a fact that "[tihese insignia perform the function of al-
lowing the wearer to express identity, affiliation or allegiance to
Pitt."258 The court also found that there was no evidence that the
consumer cared who made or sold goods or whether they were
sponsored by the source of the emblem.259
In sum, Job's Daughters and University of Pittsburgh arguably
would allow protection of the emblems only if it could be shown
that consumers were motivated to purchase such products be-
cause of sponsorship by the respective organizations and if the
other elements of unprivileged imitation or trademark infringe-
ment action could be established. In contrast, Boston Hockey, Dal-
las Cowboys, and Kaster would infer the desire of consumers for
officially sponsored products. Somewhere in between would be
Warner Brothers and Rainbow Girls, requiring proof that at least
consumers "believe" or "think" that the products are sponsored
by the creating organizations before affording protection.
Another category of symbolic functionality identified above is
the need for "status" as reflecting the self-image of the con-
sumer.260 Thus, there is consumer ego-involvement with the
product beyond its utilitarian or aesthetic value. The product sat-
isfies the consumer's needs for status by indicating to the con-
sumer and others what kind of person he or she is. Products
256. 566 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Pa. 1983). The University sought to stop the
manufacturer from using the University's insignia on soft goods. The court held
that the Pitt insignia, as used by the manufacturer, was a functional characteristic
of the soft goods and not protectable. Id. at 720. Furthermore, there was no
evidence that the Pitt insignia had taken on a secondary meaning. Id. at 721.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 716.
259. Id.
260. Status or prestige is one of the needs identified in Maslow's hierarchy
as an "esteem" need. In Maslow, needs were catagorized as ranging from "ba-
sic" needs-physiological needs, safety needs, belonging and love needs, esteem
needs (both self-esteem and esteem of others, i.e., status, prestige, recogni-
tion)-to the self-actualization needs. Cognitive needs (desire to know and un-
derstand and aesthetic needs) were not included in the hierarchy, but were part
of his humanistic theory. See A. MASLOW, supra note 4, at 90-106, 150-58; Mas-
low, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 370 (1943). For a
further discussion of consumer psychology, see D. SCHULTZ, supra note 2, at 457.
54
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss1/1
1986] CONSUMER MOTIVATION AND TRADEMARKS
possessing this type of symbolic functionality give external evi-
dence to the consumer of the desired status. The need for status
is often interrelated with the need for affiliation; for example, the
type of clothes or hair style one wears may indicate affiliation to a
group or status within that group to the wearer.26 1
A common example of status value is the prominent display
of the designer's emblem on the exterior of a product.262 The
patent display of the emblem may be seen as evidencing the self-
image of the consumer as one who has the personal characteris-
tics symbolized by that emblem. The presence of the emblem for
all to see is likely to have played a significant role in the motiva-
tion to purchase that product.2 63
One example of a case involving the potential status value of
a product is Vuitton et Fils, S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises.264 In Vuitton
et Fils, Vuitton sold a line of luggage, handbags, and related arti-
cles where substantially the entire external surfaces were covered
with repetitions of the configuration consisting of the initials
"LV," surrounded by three fluer-de-lis. 265 Vuitton had registered
261. Professor Foxall defined "group" as
a human group involv[ing] several persons who share common goals or
purposes and who interact in pursuance of these objectives; each mem-
ber of the group is perceived by others as a group member and all
members are bound together by patterns and networks of interaction
over time [which] . . . is made enduring by the evolution of a group
ideology which cements the beliefs, values and attributes and norms of
the group.
G. FOXALL, supra note 2, at 91-92 (foonote omitted). A reference group is that
which is used for an individual to compare values and perspectives, and such
membership imposes a degree of conformity on the individual. Id. at 111. For a
further discusion of a consumer's self-image, see Levy, supra note 16, at 10 1-05.
262. E.g., Izod's alligator; Gloria Vanderbilt's swan; Ralph Lauren's polo
pony; Countess Mara's initials.
263. Interestingly, in Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428
F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ga. 1977), the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia turned consumer demand for perceived status against the
manufacturer of a kit for customizing the grill of a Volkswagen Beetle to simu-
late the "Classic Grill" and "Flying Lady" hood ornament associated with Rolls-
Royce. In rejecting the idea that the attractive nature of the grill and hood orna-
ment should preclude trademark protection, the court stated: "It is tenuous at
best to contend that the grill and hood statuette are the motivating factors in the
purchase of a $50,000.00 automobile." Id. at 693. In terms of the potential
symbolic functionality, it would seem that the question to address would be
whether consumers were motivated to purchase the kits to customize their Volk-
swagons primarily because of the perceived prestige it would afford them or be-
cause they were confused that their kits were marketed or sponsored by Rolls-
Royce. In addition, the primary motivation could also be because of the "trend"
value of the kits. For a further discussion of "trend" value, see infra notes 271-
82 and accompanying text.
264. 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981).
265. Id. at 772. Most Vuitton merchandise is covered with dark brown,
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this configuration as a trademark for such articles. 266
The Ninth Circuit, in Vuitton et Fils, reversed the district
court's determination that the trademark was functional and held
that Pagliero did not demand such a broad interpretation that any
feature which contributed to the commercial success of a product
was functional as a matter of law. 267 The court noted that it was
not convinced that the Vuitton symbol was that "aspect of its
product which satisfies its consumers' tastes for beauty." 268 The
court then went on to hypothesize about consumer motivation
and stated that consumers "may be willing to sacrifice beauty for
durability" or that "the prestige afforded by carrying a certain bag
may overshadow that person's sense for the purely aesthetic. '269
The court then concluded that "[i]f the Vuitton mark increases
consumer appeal only because of the quality associated with Vuit-
ton goods, or because of the prestige associated with owning a
genuine Vuitton product, then the design is serving the legitimate
function of a trademark." 270
From the use of the word "only" in the above quotation, one
vinyl-impregnated canvas, bearing an arrangement of the initials "LV" superim-
posed one upon the other and surrounded by three floral symbols. The design
is in a contrasting mustard color. Id.
266. Id. at 774. The "LV" surrounded by flower-like symbols has been en-
tered on the Principal Register of the United States Patent and Trademark Of-
fice since 1979 and has been registered under the same number with the Patent
and Trademark Office since 1932. Id.
267. Id. The court noted that functionality analysis falls short if it stops at
aesthetics. Trademarks are always functional in the sense that they help sell
goods by identifying the manufacturer. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. (emphasis added).
270. Id. at 776. See also Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Thalheimer Co., 217
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 964 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (copying of external appearance of Rolex
watches was enjoined, even though copier's trademark appeared on dial of its
watches). The classic example of protecting prestige value is Mastercrafters
Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221
F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955), where Judge Frank stated:
True, a customer examining plaintiff's clock would see from the elec-
tric cord, that it was not an "atmospheric" clock. But, as the judge
found, plaintiff copied the design of the Atmos clock because plaintiff
intended to, and did, attract purchasers who wanted a "luxury design"
clock. This goes to show at least that some customers would buy plain-
tiff's cheaper clock for the purpose of acquiring the prestige gained by
displaying what many visitors at the customers' homes would regard as
a prestigious article. Plaintiff's wrong thus consisted of the fact that
such a visitor would be likely to assume that the clock was an Atmos
clock.
221 F.2d at 466. Under this reasoning, the originator would be protected
against the copier's selling to consumers who were fully aware of the imitation
clock's origin, to prevent those consumers from deceiving their friends.
[Vol. 3 1: p. I
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could draw the conclusion that if a consumer is motivated, at least
in part, to purchase the product because of its aesthetic appeal,
then trademark protection should be denied. Nonetheless, of in-
terest in the present investigation is the explicit recognition of the
value of "prestige" to a consumer as a motivating factor, and in
such case, the entitlement of the creator of the prestige value to
protect it against copying. The conclusion that protection of
prestige value should be afforded to the trademark owner is con-
siderably different from affording protection based on source-re-
lated quality value (e.g. durability). The latter as a motivating
factor in purchasing the product would seem to involve a cogni-
tive process on the part of the consumer. Such a utilitarian qual-
ity could be evaluated objectively. Purchases made because of
prestige value, however, would seem to involve an emotional de-
cision that the product was needed to show status in satisfaction
of an ego need.
Another category of products in which there would seem to
be a high degree of ego involvement are those exploiting the lat-
est style, fashion, or trend. Products that, in the words of Judge
Hand, "catch the public's fancy," have a high probability of com-
mercial success over and above their utilitarian or aesthetic val-
ues. The purchase of such products gives external evidence of
the purchaser's self-image that he or she is sophisticated about
style, fashion, or trend, affluent enough to make such purchases,
or a leader in setting trends. 27' Therefore, because such prod-
ucts have a high, albeit often short-lived, commercial value, they
are a natural target to be copied in an attempt to share in such
commercial value.
An example of the style or trend value of a particular design
is found in Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp. ,272 which involved shoes
with wavy-bottomed soles. In Famolare, the plaintiff conceded that
the shoes were being purchased because the distinctive appear-
ance of the wavy-bottomed soles appealed to consumers, and
other types of wavy bottom shoes had been a "total flop" in the
marketplace. 273 The court found the plaintiff's soles to be func-
tional as a matter of law, applying Pagliero and section 742 of the
Restatement of Torts.274
271. For a further discussion of ego involvement, see Levy, supra note 16.
272. 472 F. Supp. 738 (D. Hawaii 1979).
273. Id. at 744.
274. Id. (citing Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343-44 (9th
Cir. 1952); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742 comment a (1938)).
1986]
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In the same vein, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri, in Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-
Ready Appliance Mfg. Co.,275 found that the almond color of a
household stepstool was functional because it was the most popu-
lar color for kitchen accessories (evidently for that time period)
and thus contributed to consumer acceptance of the product.
Other "trendy" products have, however, received more
favorable treatment from the courts. In Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner
Toy Mfg. Corp. ,276 the Third Circuit affirmed, as modified, the
granting of a preliminary injunction barring the use of the same
color cubes as used on the "Rubik's Cube" on a puzzle game des-
ignated as "Wonderful Puzzler." 277 The court distinguished
Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries,278 and concluded that the color of
the cubes did not present the issue of aesthetic functionality.2 79
275. 518 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Mo. 1981), aff'd, 684 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1982).
The plaintiff's (Black & Decker) and the defendant's (Ever-Ready) stepstools
looked remarkably similar and both sold exclusively in an almond color. 518 F.
Supp. at 612. The defendant's name and trademark were prominently displayed
on its stool and the carton. Id. The court found that there was nothing to distin-
guish the stools in the eyes of a reasonable consumer and that there was also no
evidence that consumers associated the trade dress of the stools with Black &
Decker. Id.
276. 685 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1982). In Ideal Toy, Ideal Toy Corporation was
the distributor of the "Rubik's Cube" puzzle-a clear plastic cylinder sealed to a
black plastic base by a strip of black and gold tape. Id. at 79. The cube was
composed of 26 smaller cubes presenting a total of 54 faces colored with six
different colors. Id. The defendant, Plawner Toy, imported and distributed an
identical cube called the "Wonderful Puzzler". Id. Plawner Toy sold its cube in
a variety of sizes and its packaging was identical to Ideal's. Id. See also Canon
U.S.A., Inc. v. Saber Sales Corp., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1003 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). In
Canon, Canon began designing its 'Snappy' line of cameras in 1979. The
'Snappy' cameras came in black, red, white, yellow, and blue. Id. at 1003. Alfon
International Corporation sold camersas that came in all the same colors as the
Snappy cameras except white. Id. at 1004. The two types of cameras were iden-
tical in outward appearance. There were over 70 types of similar cameras sold in
the United States; however, only the Alfon camera used the same shades and
placement of color as the Snappy. Id. The court enjoined the Alfon Company
from using the colors red, yellow, blue, or white on their cameras. Id. at 1006.
Similarly, in Source Perrier, S.A. v. Waters of Saratoga Springs, Inc., Source Perrier
marketed the popular mineral water, Perrier, in a distinctive and recognizable
bottle (the Indian Club Bottle). - F. Supp. - [217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 617, 619]
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). The Saratoga Springs' mineral water bottle varied only slightly
from the Perrier bottle. Id. The court held that the Perrier bottle achieved a
secondary meaning and enjoined Saratoga Springs from using the same shape of
bottle although it was of a different shade of green and had a different label. Id.
at 620.
277. 685 F.2d at 79.
278. Id. at 81 (citing Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d
Cir. 1981)). For a further discussion of Keene in the context of cognitive aes-
thetic functionality, see supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
279. 685 F.2d at 81.
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One could, however, speculate that those colors used on the very
popular "Rubik's Cube" could well have symbolic (trend) value to
consumers as compared to other color combinations. As stated
by the Second Circuit in American Footware Corp. v. General Footware
Co.:280 "[O]ne can capitalize on a market or fad created by an-
other provided that it is not accomplished by confusing the public
into mistakenly purchasing the product in the belief that the
product is the product of the competitor." 28'
The Eleventh Circuit, in Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
The Toy Loft, Inc. ,282 categorized adoption papers and birth certifi-
cates sold with toy dolls as trade dress and, hence, not utilitarian,
in that such trade dress represented a sales technique designed to
make the product readily identifiable to consumers and unique in
the marketplace. 283 It can, however, hardly be denied that the
inclusion of the adoption papers and birth certificates for the doll
significantly added to the commercial value of that doll. Whether
or not these papers were categorized as trade dress or part of the
product itself, the purchase of the doll with such papers satisfied
some need in the consumer-perhaps to have the latest fad as a
reflection of self-image, or even more mundanely, because of the
utilitarian functional value of those papers in playing with the
doll. One would imagine that the inclusion of the adoption pa-
pers and the birth certificate satisfied an ego need in being able to
show these papers along with the doll to others. Moreover, there
were no ready alternatives to the inclusion of such papers with the
doll to satisfy this particular consumer desire.
One case that rather blatantly shows the commercial value of
the direct expression of desired self-image is Damn I'm Good, Inc.
280. 609 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980). In Ameii-
can Footware, footware marketed with the trademark "bionic" brought an action
aginst a manufacturer who used "bionic" in the manufacture and sale of inex-
pensive chlidren's sneakers under a license granted by a television studio. 609
F.2d at 658-59.
281. 609 F.2d at 662.
282. 684 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1982). Between May 1977 and January 1978,
Xavier Roberts (later incorporated as Appalachian Artworks, Inc.) sold 80 soft-
sculpture dolls, of which half contained a copyright notice and half did not con-
tain a notice. Id. at 823. By February 1978, Roberts began producing and sell-
ing the dolls, and by June 1, 1979, obtained a copyright certificate. Id. In
November 1979, Lawson (owner of the Toy Loft) began selling similar signed
dolls with adoption papers. Id. The court held that Lawson infringed on Rob-
erts' copyright. Id. at 832.
283. Id. at 832. Moreover, the court found that Lawson's use of Roberts'
trade dress (the adoption papers and birth certificate) was likely to lead to con-
sumer confusion as to the manufacturer. Id.
1986]
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v. Sakowitz, Inc. 284 In Damn I'm Good, the plaintiff sought to enjoin
the defendant from selling bracelets inscribed with the words
"Damn I'm Good," the inscription originated by the plaintiff.2 85
The court refused to enjoin the defendant from using the in-
scription, finding it to be functional because it was a crucial ingre-
dient in the commercial success of the plaintiff's product,
independent of any source-identifying function it might serve. 286
With respect to the ego involvement of the purchaser and the mo-
tivation for purchasing a bracelet, the court stated: "A seeker of
'ego-boosting' would find his quest quite unfulfilled by a bracelet
lacking the Damn I'm Good inscription. '" 28 7
The conclusion in Damn I'm Good is an interesting contrast to
the symbolic value of affiliation discussed in Boston Hockey, Rain-
bow Girls, and Warner Brothers. The court in Damn I'm Good cen-
tered not on the public's belief that the use of the emblem on the
product was licensed by the emblem's creator, but rather upon
the consumer's need to be ego-satisfied by the emblem on the
product.
Courts have generally recognized that the symbolic value of a
product may provide the primary motivation for its purchase. In-
deed, a significantly expanded market or the very existence of a
market for that product may depend upon its symbolic value of
the consumer.2 88 The policy question not directly addressed by
the courts is whether the tertiary symbolic meaning of a product
should be protected. In other words, is there any justification for
284. 514 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
285. Id. at 1358. The plaintiff's first application for a trademark for the
phrase, "Damn I'm Good," was denied because the mark appeared to be an
ornamental design and did not indicate origin of the goods. Id. at 1359. The
plaintiff was allowed to re-apply after placing the words "Damn I'm Good, Inc."
on the tags attached to the jewelry. Id.
286. Id. at 1362. The Damn I'm Good court found that "the role played by
the phrase Damn I'm Good in identifying the source of the bracelet is small if
any." Id.
287. Id. See also PPS, Inc. v. Jewelry Sales Representatives, Inc., 392 F.
Supp. 375, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (jewelry bearing inscription "I like you" held to
be functional and to lack acquired source-motivation type of secondary
meaning).
288. See, e.g., Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675
F.2d 852, 855 (7th Cir. 1982) (popular TV show created demand for toy car);
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1981) (replica of
automobile shown on TV show developed large market); Boston Professional
Hockey Assn. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1011 (5th Cir.)
(thousands of fans saw team emblems on TV, in magazines, and at games), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc.,
566 F. Supp. 711, 721 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (University of Pittsburgh had emblems,
insignia, and slogans for various teams and school groups).
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treating the symbolic value of a product any differently from its
utilitarian or, perhaps, its aesthetic value.
In terms of the two fundamental policy rationales for trade-
mark protection, if consumers are indifferent as to the source of
the product having symbolic value, then the originator of that
symbolic value can not complain that trade is being diverted from
it or that consumers are being deceived. On the other hand, one
could logically assert that consumers are concerned about the
source of products having symbolic value in the form of affiliation
and status. Such concern may be presumed, as Judge Hand did in
the Kastor case. It may also be presumed that consumers desire
"official" or "status" products if they believe or think that the
product originated or was sponsored by the creator of the sym-
bolic meaning. However, this presumes the answer to the basic
question of whether consumers care about source or sponsorship.
Without direct proof, this presumption may go beyond the policy
grounds of diversion of trade and consumer deception, unless the
presumption happens to be correct. The reliance on the appro-
priation/entitlement rationale is made explicit in Warner Brothers:
"To deny Warner Bros. injunctive relief would be to enable Gay
Toys 'to reap where [i]t has not sown.' "289
There would seem to be less justification for the protection
of products having symbolic functionality under the appropria-
tion/entitlement rationale than for protection of products having
aesthetic functionality. All can sympathize with an incentive for
providing more aesthetically pleasing products; however, in order
to afford protection, there would need to exist a significant
number of equally attractive alternative designs. 290 This is not
the case with symbolic functionality; for there, it is the symbol
which sells. The great value of having the exclusive right to man-
ufacture or license products having symbolic functionality is
shown in the Warner Bros. litigation, where retail sales of licensed
"General Lee" toy cars were estimated at over $100 million in
1981.291
289. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1981).
290. Compare Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981)
(limited number of alternatives for architecturally compatible luminares) with
Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1982) (wide
variety of colors, shapes, and markings could be used to differentiate faces of
cube puzzle). For a further discussion of the relevance of the availability of alter-
native designs, see Note, supra note 37.
291. Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d 852,
854 (7th Cir. 1982).
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Moreover, with respect to emblems and their affiliative value,
the matter of protection is of some consequence, because these
emblems can be (and are) displayed on substantially any product.
If the emblem itself is protected, this grants in rem protection to
whatever product to which that emblem is affixed if the market for
the product depends on the emblem's symbolic value. Some
measure of control may be imposed under the likelihood of con-
fusion standard when the type of product in question is not of the
type generally licensed. Basing the property right upon how the
creator of the emblem enforces it, however, is basically a boot-
strap proposition: The greater the insistence upon a property
right, the greater the property right that exists. This argument
worked to the disadvantage of the plaintiffs in Job's Daughters292
and Rainbow Girls293 where exclusive right to license was lost be-
cause of the lackluster control of the usage of their respective em-
blems. 294 On the other hand, rigorous control by professional
sports teams and television producers expands the exclusive right
to more products as more licenses are granted, and, of course,
the more extensive the right, the greater the incentive for creating
such symbolic products, which by their very nature have no sub-
stitutes. In short, one would expect that with great incentives be-
ing provided for the creation of products having tertiary meaning
in the nature of affective or symbolic value, the logical economic
consequence would be underinvestment in areas of the economy
less sheltered from competition.
292. International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg and Co., 633
F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1981). For a further discussion of Job's Daughers, see supra
notes 251-55 and accompanying text.
293. Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co.,
676 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1982). For a further discussion of Rainbow Girls, see
supra note 239-41 and accompanying text.
294. If the stumbling block to protection is the difficulty of proving likeli-
hood of confusion, such as in Job's Daughters and Rainbow Girls, one might sug-
gest, with some trepidation, resort to state "anti-dilution" statutes, where, in
theory, likelihood of confusion is not an element of the statutory tort and under
which such well-known and distinctive "marks" might receive more favorable
consideration. Twenty-three states have "anti-dilution" statutes. See Pattishall,
supra note 64, at 289-90 nn.5-6 (citations to anti-dilution statutes and discussion
of emerging requirements of protection). Indeed, in Bi-Rite Enters. v. Button
Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), the New York "anti-dilution" statute
was asserted in an attempt to enjoin the sale of buttons bearing the logos and
likenesses of rock stars. The court held that the statute did not reach defend-
ants' use on the rather curious ground that such use strengthened plaintiff's
marks rather than diluting them. Id. at 1196.
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V. CONSUMER MOTIVATION AND GENERICNESS
The most controversial use of consumer motivation has been
by the Ninth Circuit in the Anti-Monopoly case2 95 as a test for
genericness. In essence, the Ninth Circuit would declare a name
"generic" if consumers were motivated to purchase a product by
that name primarily because they desired the utilitarian function
of the product rather than because they desired that product from
a particular source.
The use of consumer motivation as a test of genericness
struck at the very heart of a long cherished presumption in trade-
mark law that, when consumers ask for a product by its trade-
mark, it is presumed (seemingly conclusively) that they desire the
product from the associated source and would be deceived if they
received otherwise. If this presumption could be rebutted by a
survey of consumer motivation, such rebuttal would not only
throw into question the validity of trademarks on "unique" prod-
ucts (such as "Monopoly" for a game) but also would cast doubt
on well known marks (such as "Tide" for a detergent).2 96
The consumer motivation test of genericness proved so un-
acceptable that it was with surprising expedition proscribed by
295. As used herein, and unless otherwise qualified, "Anti-Monopoly" will
refer to Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc. (Anti-Monopoly
III), 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983). The cases
preceding this one, according to the numbering used by the Ninth Circuit in
Anti-Monopoly III, are Anti-Monopoly 1, 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979) and Anti-
Monopoly 11, 515 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir.
1982). For discussions of the Anti-Monopoly decisions, see Greenbaum, Ginsberg
& Weinburg, A Proposalfor Evaluating Genericism after "Anti-monopoly," 73 TRADE-
MARK REP. 101 (1983); Hewitt & Krieder, Anti-Monopoly-Autopsy for Trademarks?,
11 AM. PAT. L.A.OJ. 151 (1983); Stern, Genericide: Cancellation of A Registered
Trademark, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 666 (1983); Zeisel, The Surveys that Broke Monop-
oly, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 896 (1983).
296. In an attempt to discredit the Anti-Monopoly motivation survey, by
reductio ad absurdum, General Mills introduced a motivation survey conducted on
Tide detergent, where the question was asked: "Would you buy Tide primarily
because you like Procter and Gamble's products or primarily because you like
Tide detergent?" Anti-Monopoly III, 684 F.2d at 1326. Approximately 68% of
the respondents answered that they liked Tide detergent. Id. The court inter-
preted this result as not being absurd, but rather stated:
We do not know whether the general public thinks this, or if it does, is
correct in thinking this, or whether Procter and Gamble intend them to
think it. If the general public does think this, and if the test formulated
in Anti-Monopoly I could be mechanically extended to the very different
subject of detergents, then Procter and Gamble might have cause for
alarm.
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Congress, 297 thereby legislatively reversing that portion of the
Anti-Monopoly decision. Even though the point may now be some-
what moot, except for the necessity of construing the term "pur-
chaser motivation" in the statute,298 a few words concerning the
possible interrelationship between consumer motivation and the
doctrine of genericness may be useful, at least insofar as such in-
terrelationship bears on any presumptions concerning human be-
havior or competition.
It seems logical that a consumer who is motivated to satisfy a
particular need would first select, from various categories of
products, the one category that has, in the consumer's view, the
highest probability of satisfying that need. The selection process
then continues with one product within the chosen category be-
ing selected, again on the basis of having the highest probability,
in the consumer's view, of satisfying the particular need for the
consumer at that time. The first choice by a consumer can be
described as a genus selection-categories compete, and one par-
ticular genus is selected. The second decision can be described as
a species selection-once the genus is selected, a species is se-
lected within this genus, again, on a competitive basis among
species.
In the teapot hypothetical, if we stipulate a broad need for
food or drink and then particularize this to a need for a hot bever-
age, genus competition may be seen, for example, between coffee
pots and teapots. If tea is perceived as the beverage best satisfy-
ing the consumer's need, the genus "teapot" will be selected.
The next step involves the discriminate selection of a species of
teapot out of the available species within the genus teapot. The
species of teapot selected, as detailed above, would depend upon
utilitarian, aesthetic, affective, or symbolic value or a combination
of these values associated with a particular species by that con-
sumer, hence affording that species a higher motivational value
over others in that genus.
If a consumer perceives that a particular teapot has unique
characteristics, the consumer may consider it to be in a class by
itself, e.g., an electric teapot. Such a teapot, depending on the
perceived needs of the consumer, might not compete with other
teapots (non-electric) within the broad genus of teapots.
297. See Trademark Clarificaton Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat.
3335 (1984), amending Lanham Act § 14(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1982).
298. For the text of the new § 14(c) of the Lanham Act, as amended by the
Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, see infra text accompanying note 332.
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Producers go to great lengths to emphasize the differences
between and the unique features of their products and those of
competitors, whether in the same or a different genus. From a
marketing standpoint, it is highly important that a product be
considered unique and hence be a genus unto itself so that there
are no other species of that particular product with which to com-
pete. If such is the case, consumers will not think in terms of
comparing this product with others performing broadly the same
function, but rather will make their selection at the genus level.
The selection of a distinctive name and appearance to distinguish
this product from others on the market will enhance its consumer
recognition as a unique product. In such circumstances, the
source of the unique product finds itself in the enviable position
of being the only supplier of that genus of product and having
only to compete with other genuses rather than having to com-
pete on a discriminative species level within a broader genus.
The cultivation, usually at considerable expense, of the pub-
lic's recognition of a product's uniqueness and identity by name,
appearance, or both, is not without risks. When, in the public's
mind, the name or appearance primarily identifies the product as
a genus rather than indicating a product from a single source (as a
species of a broader genus), the name, appearance, or both may
be held to be "generic," and hence be in the public domain,
freely available to all as a means to identify that genus of prod-
uct.2 99 Thus, when consumers ask for or select such a unique
product defining its own genus by name or appearance, there is
ambiguity as to their motivation. Are consumers motivated to
purchase that product because of a desire for the genus or be-
cause of a desire for a species from a particular source of such
products?
The Anti-Monopoly case raises the issue of the genericness of
the trademark "Monopoly" for a board game in factual circum-
stances quite similar to those in the landmark case of Kellogg Co. v.
National Biscuit Co. 3 00 In the Anti-Monopoly case, Parker Brothers
and its successor, General Mills, enjoyed a monopoly in the real
299. For a general discussion of the topic of genericness, see 1 J. MCCAR-
THY, supra note 232, ch. 12 (1973 & Supp. 1982). See also Coverdale, Trademarks
and Generic Words: An Effect-on-Competition Test, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 686 (1984);
Folsom & Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323 (1980).
300. 305 U.S. 111 (1938). In Kellogg, Nabisco and its predecessors had a
monopoly based upon patents for the marketing of shredded wheat for approxi-
mately 30 years before Kellogg entered the market. Id. at 113-14. For a further
discussion of the Kellogg case, see supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
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estate trading game sold under the name "Monopoly" for about
thirty years prior to the introduction into the market of a board
game sold under the name "Anti-Monopoly." 30'
In Anti-Monopoly J,3 2 the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's finding that the trademark "Monopoly" for game equip-
ment was valid and was being infringed by the use of "Anti-Mo-
nopoly" on the game marketed by the appellant.303 The court
required application of the Kellogg genericness test, stating:
"Thus the MONOPOLY trademark is valid only if 'the primary
significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is
not the product but the producer.' "304 To apply this test, the
court would inquire into whether usage of the term indicated to
consumers a genus of product (generic usage) or one species of
that product genus (trademark usage).305 According to the court
of appeals, the fundamental error made by the district court was
its apparent assumption that, for "Monopoly" to be a generic
term, the term would have to indicate the entire genus of "all
board games involving real estate trading."30 6 This, the court
concluded, did not address the crucial question of whether con-
sumers thought of Monopoly as a unique game, and then differ-
entiated it from other real estate trading games by source-
relevant characteristics.3 07
The court did not, however, merely admonish the district
court to apply the Kellogg "primary significance" test, but sug-
gested an investigation into the motivation underlying a con-
sumer's use of the term "Monopoly" in making a purchase as a
means of resolving the genus/species ambiguity in the term's us-
age.3 08 The court reasoned that in asking for Monopoly by name
the consumer may mean: "I would like Parker Brothers' version
of a real estate trading game, because I like Parker Brothers'
products."30 9 Such an action would be indicative that the con-
301. Anti-Monopoly 1, 611 F.2d 296, 299 (9th Cir. 1979).
302. Id.
303. Id. at 306.
304. Id. at 302 (citing Kellogg, 350 U.S. at 118).
305. 611 F.2d at 302, 303.
306, Id. at 305.
307. Id. at 306. The court stated: "Source identification is the only word
function which trademark law is designed to protect. If the primary significance
of the trademark is to describe the type of product rather than the producer, the
trademark has become a generic term and is no longer a valid trademark." Id. at
304.
308. Id. at 306, 307.
309. Id. at 305-06.
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sumer differentiated between the Monopoly game and other
games according to source-particular criteria, presumably the
quality of Parker Brothers' products, and desired a species of
game made by Parker Brothers.
Alternatively, the court reasoned, that, by asking for Monop-
oly, consumers may mean: "I want a 'Monopoly' game. Don't
bother showing me Anti-Monopoly, or EASY MONEY, or back-
gammon. I am interested in playing the game of Monopoly. I
don't much care who makes it."310 If the second meaning is the
one intended by consumers, source is irrelevant, and the term
"Monopoly" defines a genus of game to consumers.311 Thus, ac-
cording to the court, the species/genus differentiation may be
made on the basis of what motivates consumers in the use of the
term. 312
The suggestion that consumer motivation may be used as the
genus/species determining factor was immediately taken up by
the successful appellant, who undertook a motivation survey
along the lines specified above. This survey was rejected by the
district court in Anti-Monopoly HI,313 but approved by the court of
appeals in Anit-Monopoly 111.314
The results of this survey showed that ninety-two percent of
the respondents were aware of "Monopoly," the business game
produced by Parker Brothers.3 15 Of these, sixty-two percent had
purchased the game in the past or intended to do so in the fu-
ture.316 These respondents were then asked why they bought or
would buy Monopoly. Not surprisingly, eighty-two percent re-
sponded that they desired Monopoly for the purpose of playing
the game, that is, for its utilitarian functional value, such function-
ality presumably being the primary motivation for the
purchase.31 7 These respondents were then given a choice be-
tween alternative statements as best explaining their reasons for
purchasing the game: "I want a 'Monopoly' game primarily be-
cause I am interested in playing 'Monopoly', I don't much care
310. Id. at 306.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. 515 F. Supp. at 453. The court stated that the Anti-Monopoly survey
misconstrued the nature of the inquiry mandated by the Anti-Monopoly I court in
addition to manifesting a number of serious methodological flaws. Id.
314. 684 F.2d at 1324-26.
315. Id. at 1324.
316. Id.
317. Id.
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who makes it .... [or] I would like Parker Brothers' 'Monopoly'
game primarily because I like Parker Brothers' products."318 The
first statement was selected by approximately two-thirds31 9 of the
respondents, while one-third selected the second statement. 320
The court found that the survey supported the conclusion that
the primary significance of Monopoly to consumers was the prod-
uct rather than its producer.321
The survey results reflected common sense that the vast ma-
jority (eight-two percent) of consumers were motivated to buy
Monopoly to play the game, presumably to satisfy their need for
entertainment or perhaps for sociability. The question remains
whether the two statements discriminate between genus and spe-
cies usage of the name Monopoly. The only difference between
the first statement and the original one establishing utilitarian
motivation is the qualifier "I don't much care who makes it." Ap-
proximately two-thirds of the respondents indicated that source
was not a primary motivating factor in the desire to purchase the
game by the name Monopoly. 322 But respondents were forced to
select the first statement or the second one. In this forced choice
situation, is the first statement necessarily genus-indicating? At
best, the survey shows that playing the game is more important
than its source.
The second statement ("I would like Parker Brothers' 'Mo-
nopoly' game primarily because I like Parker Brothers' prod-
Ucts") 3 2 3 is presumably intended to identify species usage of the
world Monopoly. Indeed, approximately one-third of the respon-
dents indicated they were source-motivated to acquire the Parker
Brothers' product.3 24 The second statement is, however, ambigu-
318. Id.
319. Id. Sixty-five percent of the people who said that they had purchased
the game within the last couple of years or would purchase it in the future chose
the first statement. Id.
320. Id. Thirty-two percent of the people who had purchased the game
within the last couple of years or would purchase it in the future chose the sec-
ond statement. Id.
321. Id. at 1326.
322. Id. at 1324.
323. Id.
324. Id. It has been argued that the second statement requiring that the
consumer desire the product from an identifiable source (Parker Brothers) is
inconsistent with the so called "single anonymous source rule," under which, in
the context of secondary meaning, the association need not be with a source
identifiable by name by the consumer. See Greenbaum, Ginsburg & Weinburg,
supra note 295, at 112. However, in the context of the survey in Anti-Monopoly,
all of the respondents asked to select the first or second statement were aware
that Monopoly was produced by Parker Brothers. Anti-Monopoly 111, 684 F.2d at
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ous in that it is not clear whether its intent is to exclude consider-
ation of the utilitarian value of the game to the consumer by the
elimination of any reference to playing the game. If so, this
would be contrary to the common sense notion that a consumer
primarily purchases a product for its utilitarian function and sec-
ondarily may select a product from a particular source because of
source-related reasons-the reputation of its source.
If the second statement is taken literally, it is rather surpris-
ing that one out of three respondents was buying primarily be-
cause of source regardless of function, rather than because of
function plus source or function irrespective of source (as in the
first statement). A plausible explanation for this result would be
that many of the respondents selecting the second statement pre-
sumed the utilitarian function of the game and were source-moti-
vated (not surprisingly, perhaps, because of Parker Brothers
being the single source of the game for over thirty years). Had
the second statement expressly included the first sentence of the
first statement, so that the distinguishing factor was source rele-
vance or irrelevance, the results would seem more credible in
terms of consumer motivation. This is particularly so because the
motivation survey is asking why consumers bought or would buy
the product, not what the term primarily signifies to them accord-
ing to the Kellogg test.
The criticism of the consumer motivation test for genericness
was prompt and effective. Judge Nies', in her concurring opinion
in In re DC Comics3 25 denounced the consumer motivation theory
introduced in Anti-Monopoly I, although not referring to the case
by name. She stated:
The board apparently interpreted the truism as impos-
ing a requirement that to indicate 'source,' a word,
1324. In fact, 92% of all respondents were aware that Monopoly was produced
by Parker Brothers. Id. The Trademark Clarificaton Act of 1984 codified the
"single anonymous source rule," by amending the definition of a trademark in
§ 15 of the Lanham Act to read:
The term trade-mark includes any word, name, symbol or device or any
combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant
to identify and distinguish his goods including a unique product, from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods,
even if that source is unknown.
Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335 (1984), amending 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982) (ital-
icized portions were added by amendment). The definition of "service mark"
has similarly been amended.
325. 689 F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982). In DC Comics, the applicant sought to
register drawings of fictitious comic book characters as trademarks for toy dolls.
Id. at 1043.
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name, symbol or device must not identify goods of any-
one. This misunderstanding led the board and has led
some courts into an esoteric and extraneous inquiry fo-
cusing on what motivates the purchasing public to buy
particular goods, the product itself or the source. Once
it is understood that a trademark is functioning to indi-
cate 'source' when it identifies goods of a particular source,
the truism then reflects the above-stated objectives of
trademark law [protection of trade identity and consum-
ers] and the way trademarks actually function in the mar-
ket place. The reason the public is motivated to buy the product
... is of concern to market researchers but is legally immaterial to
the issue of whether a particular designation is generic.326
Judge Nies, nonetheless, went on to state that "the primary objec-
tive of purchasers is to obtain particular goods, not to seek out
particular sources or producers, as such. Motivation does not
change a ... term [which has acquired secondary meaning or is
arbitrary] into as generic designation."3 27
One may ask, however, if it is not consumer motivation that
changes a trademark into a generic designation, what is it? What
motivates a consumer to satisfy a need for "aspirin" tablets,3 28 a
"Thermos" bottle,329 a "Monopoly" game (or a "Superman" doll
in the context of DC Comics) by asking for it by that designation? If
the primary significance of the name or appearance to consumers
is the product, consumers would probably be motivated to ask for
it, or select it, by that name or appearance. In other words, there
would have to be a mental nexus between "primary significance"
and "motivation" as expressed in usage.
Although assertively relying on the trademark policies of pro-
tecting trade identity and consumer deception, Judge Nies' analy-
sis impliedly provides incentive for not only aesthetically pleasing
designs, as referred to above, but also for uniqueness: "No prin-
ciple of trademark law requires the imposition of penalties for
originality, creativeness, attractiveness, or uniqueness of one's
product or requires a holding that the name arbitrarily selected to
326. Id. at 1054 (emphasis added).
327. Id.
328. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (patent
for "acetyl salicylic acid" expired and product's name, "aspirin," was then in
public domain).
329. See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.
1963) (majority of public did not know "Thermos" had trademark significance).
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identify the product, or a unique product design of a product,
cannot also function as an identification of source.1330 Hence, an
incentive should be provided to the producers of unique products
as well as attractive ones, even though consumers may primarily
desire the attractiveness or uniqueness irrespective of any value
associated with its source. The assertion that the way "trade-
marks actually function in the market" is to identify "goods of a
particular source" reflects market reality only when the courts rec-
ognize that as "reality" and avail themselves of the fiction that
consumers are motivated to purchase "goods of a particular source"
when they identify goods with that source or ask for goods by a
particular word.331
To cure the perceived evils of Anti-Monopoly, the Trademark
Clarification Act of 1984 amended section 14(c) of the Lanham
Act by adding:
A registered mark shall not be deemed to be the com-
mon descriptive name of goods or services solely be-
cause such mark is also used as a name of or to identify a
unique product or service. The primary significance of
the registered mark to the relevant public rather than
purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining
whether the registered mark has become the common
descriptive name of goods or services in connection with
which it has been used.3 32
The amendment thus proscribes the use of consumer motivation,
at least as practiced in Anti-Monopoly, as a test for genericness and
330. 689 F.2d 1042, 1053 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J., concurring).
331. This reflects the circuitous reasoning admonished by Felix Cohen:
The current legal argument runs: One who by the ingenuity of his ad-
vertising or the quality of his product has induced consumer respon-
siveness to a particular name, symbol, form of packaging, etc., has
thereby created a thing of value; a thing of value is property; the creator
of property is entitled to protection against third parties who seek to
deprive him of his property .... The vicious circle inherent in this
reasoning is plain. It purports to base legal protection upon economic
value, when, as a matter of actual fact, the economic value of a sales
device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally protected.
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809,
815 (1935) (footnote omitted). See also Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151
F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J. concurring).
332. Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat.
3335. For a further discussion of the Trademark Clarification Act, see supra note
324.
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mandates the "primary significance" test,3 3 3 as the exclusive test
for genericness. Seemingly, the correct survey question to ask
consumers under this test is something like: "What is the primary
significance of [name of a product] to you? (a) The name of a
product from a single source or (b) The name of a product." If
the survey shows that the primary significance is (a), this would
indicate trademark significance, while if (b), this would indicate
genericness.
This interpretation of the significance consumers give to
name, however, involves certain assumptions concerning con-
sumer behavior. Hence, when a consumer responds that the pri-
mary significance of the name is (a) (a product from a single
source), the presumption is that such a consumer, by asking for
the product by name, is primarily motivated to purchase it from
that source.
Conversely, when a consumer answers that the primary sig-
nificance of the name is (b) (a product), the presumption is that
such a consumer asking for the product by name is primarily mo-
tivated to purchase it for its utilitarian function and is indifferent
to its source. The amendment precludes the asking of the direct
question concerning consumer motivation in making the
purchase and avoids the potential embarrassment to trademark
owners of consumer indifference to source.
The amendment would also seem to eliminate the use of a
"Thermos"-type survey such as the one used in King-Seeley Ther-
mos Co. v. Aladdin Industries.33 4 In such a survey, respondents are
given a description of a product and then asked whether they are
familiar with it. Those who answer positively are asked: "If you
were going to purchase this kind of product, what would you ask
for?" Of course, the more closely the product is described, the
more likelihood that respondents will give the name by which
they identify the product under investigation. If the product is
unique, the description would seemingly by definition describe its
uniqueness and virtually insure its identification by name. The
amendment, however, precludes a finding of genericness "solely
333. This codifies the Kellogg test, 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938). See supra note
309.
334. 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963). In King-Seeley, King-Seeley Thermos Co.
sought to enjoin Aladdin Industries from selling vacuum-insulated containers as
"thermos bottles." Id. at 578. Aladdin argued that King-Seeley's registered
trademark "Thermos" should be cancelled because "Thermos" or "Thermos
bottle" was a generic term. Id. The court upheld the validity of the trademarks
but held that Aladdin's generic and descriptive use of the words would not in-
fringe on the trademark. Id. at 581.
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because such mark is used as a name of or to identify a unique
product or service."
In sum, the amendment to section 14(c) provides a signifi-
cant incentive for the creation of so-called unique products not
only with respect to the name used to identify that product but
also with respect to the appearance of such products. The spe-
cies/genus dichotomy is rejected. As a matter of law, the unique
product is a species of some larger genus, which need not be
identified or necessarily considered. This legal conclusion has
obvious advantages in the marketplace where a unique product
serving as a genus unto itself need not compete with other species
in satisfying consumer needs for that generic utilitarian function.
Moreover, the incentive is enhanced by the diminished risk that
the name or appearance of the unique product will become ge-
neric under the statutory test.
The risk is not entirely eliminated and one could speculate
on the outcome of a "primary significance" survey on "Trivial
Pursuit." 3 5 Nonetheless, potential competitors in the unique
product would seem to be far less likely to challenge the mark
used to name or identify the unique product.
Consumers, of course, pay the cost of this "special pocket" of
protection for the unique product, even though consumers may
be indifferent to the source of the unique product. With respect
to the issue of genericness, the law in its current state has rele-
gated consumer motivation to the market researcher, as espoused
by Judge Nies and promulgated by the Trademark Improvement
Act of 1984. This may not, however, be without cost in terms of
the potential for diminished competition and overinvestment in
product differentiation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In viewing the construct of consumer motivation in the con-
text of the trademark and unfair competition doctrines of func-
tionality (utilitarian and aesthetic), secondary meaning, and
genericness, certain presumptions concerning human (consumer)
335. Cf Selchow & Righter Co. v. Decipher, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 1489, 1504
(E.D. Va. 1984). In Decipher, the court held that "Trivial Pursuit" was not ge-
neric where the defendant had failed to conduct any survey and relied only on
the testimony of a marketing expert that "Trivial Pursuit" has become or is be-
coming generic. See also Horn Abbot Ltd. v. Sarsaparillo Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 360
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (genericness issue appears not to have been addressed; "Trivial
Pursuit" was used in title of defendant's book and was identified as registered
trademark of plaintiff).
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behavior and the concomitant effect on competition have been
identified according to the manner in which these doctrines are
applied by the courts. With regard to products (or features)
found to be utilitarian functional, a conclusive presumption is
made that consumers are motivated to purchase such products to
satisfy a need for utility or for user or maker efficiency. Under
this presumption, actual consumer motivation is irrelevant; free
competition theory is promoted by privileging the copying of
such products, provided the copier identifies itself as the source
of the product in a nonconfusing manner within the mandate of
fair competition. The balance between free and fair competition
can-with some objective assurance- be established with relative
efficiency within the definition of utilitarian functionality as
applied.336
If a product (or feature) is found to be not utilitarian func-
tional, any presumptions made concerning consumer behavior
and competition depend upon whether or not such products (or
features) are recognized as having a need-satisfying value to con-
sumers beyond serving to indicate source. If the inquiry into
functionality is limited to its utiltarian aspect, the presumption
(conclusive, it seems) is made, upon proof of source association,
that consumers are motivated to purchase such products because
of their associated source. On the other hand, if the doctrine of
aesthetic functionality (in any of its various formulations) is rec-
ognized or if the source-motivation form of secondary meaning is
required, the presumption (seemingly rebuttable) is made that
consumers may be motivated to purchase the product to satisfy
needs beyond utilitarian ones. Thus, denying competitors access
to such nonutilitarian features could adversely affect competition
in products in the public domain. 3s7
336. If a narrow definition (utilitarian superiority) is applied as in In re Mor-
ton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A. 1982), or Sicilia Di
R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1984), the balance tips
toward fair competition, while if a broad definition (consumer perception of util-
itarian function) is applied as inJ.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120
F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1941), the balance then swings toward free competition.
337. A distinction seems to be recognized-at least implicitly-between
whether or not the motivation to purchase a product for other than utilitarian
consideration is cognitively motivated. With regard to products as to which con-
sumers are likely to exercise cognition in the selection process (e.g., for reasons
of color, style, or design compatibility), free competition theory would appear to
require the right to copy on the same basis as utilitarian features, unless public
policy justifies providing an incentive for the creation of products satisfying a
nonutilitarian need on a cognitive level. When the product is of such a nature
that a consumer may be motivated to purchase it irrationally, i.e., in the categori-
zation used here, on the basis of affective or symbolic appeal of the product, the
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The 1984 Trademark Clarification Act, in amending the Lan-
ham Act, reverses the Anti-Monopoly case and bars the use of con-
sumer motivation as a test for genericness.338 The amendment
further codifies the single anonymous source rule and denies the
use of the uniqueness of the product as the basis for determining
genericness. 339 Hence, so-called unique products are conclu-
sively established as a species of a larger genus. The presumption
imposed by the amendment is that consumers, when purchasing
such a product by name, are motivated to purchase it because of
the associated source rather than because of the particular unique
function provided by the product. This presumption may not
comport with the reality of consumer behavior and the reality of
the marketplace.
Regarding the importance of source to consumers in their
selection process, merely establishing that a particular product
(or feature) is not utilitarian does not establish ipso facto, upon
proof of source association, that consumers are motivated to
purchase the product because of source-related reasons. This is
recognized by those courts accepting the doctrine of aesthetic
functionality, i.e., functionality beyond that which is purely utilita-
rian in nature. If consumers are purchasing a product because of
certain values attributed to that product itself, irrespective of its
source, permitting competitors to copy would not then result in
the violation of the fundamental trademark and unfair competi-
tion principles protecting trade identity and consumers.
Sales are not diverted nor are consumers deceived when con-
sumers are indifferent to source but, rather, are motivated to
policy question of whether the tertiary meaning of such products should be pro-
tected on the basis of source association or deemed to be in the public domain
arises. A paternalistic approach would protect those consumers most suscepti-
ble to affective or symbolic appeal who act against their own best economic in-
terests in making purchases on an "impulse" or "emotional" basis, at least to
the extent of having the opportunity to buy at the lowest competitive price.
Moreover, protection grounded upon a finding that consumers "believe" or
"think" that the use of the tertiary meaning with respect to a product was au-
thorized by the creation of the tertiary meaning seems justifiable only if public
policy warrants providing an incentive for the satisfaction of irrational needs.
On the other hand, in view of the large investment which may be required to
create products having tertiary meaning, permitting copiers to have a "free
ride" would act as a disincentive for their creation. Whether it is in the public
interest to provide an incentive for the creation of tertiary meaning is questiona-
ble, as is whether the courts should make that determination rather than the
legislature.
338. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1982). For a further discussion of the amend-
ment, see supra note 324 and accompanying text.
339. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1982).
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purchase the product because of its inherent (albeit nonu-
tilitarian) value to them, where such value is, in theory, in the
public domain. Protection granted against copying such products
would appear to be based on appropriation/entitlement ration-
ale. It is far from clear, in the absence of congressional action,
that any incentive should be provided for product differentiation,
whether on the basis of aesthetics or uniqueness. Nonetheless, it
does not seem entirely consistent with fair competition theory to
impose a strong disincentive for the creation of products that are
aesthetically pleasing or even unique by permitting free access to
immediate copying; this is particularly true if one takes into ac-
count the amazing speed with which products may be copied us-
ing today's modern technology. Within a very short period after
the introduction of a new product, the creator is faced with com-
petition from copiers not saddled with developmental and mar-
keting expenses of the creator.
The copier's intent is at best ambiguous in the case of inten-
tional and slavish copying of a successful product, even when the
copier clearly identifies itself as the source of that product. The
intent of the copier, at least in part, is to trade off the goodwill of
the source of the copied product as well as the permissible trad-
ing off the good will of the product itself. The dividing line be-
tween trading off the goodwill of the source or the goodwill of the
product is as murky as the proper balance between free and fair
competition. Because of the inherent difficulties in ascertaining
consumer motivation, yet bearing in mind the competitive conse-
quences of presuming particular behavior on the basis of source
association, the following procedural approach is suggested in
product simulation cases.
In product simulation cases brought under section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act or under state common law (as far as permissible
within the constraints of Sears and Compco),340 it is suggested that
a prima facie case of unprivileged imitation should be established
upon proof by the plaintiff (creator) that:
1) the product (feature) copied is not utilitarian functional;
2) the product (feature) copied has acquired secondary
meaning in being associated with a single anonymous
source; and
340. See, e.g., SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625
F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980) (recognizing tort of unprivileged imitation on basis of
New Jersey common law).
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3) there is likelihood of confusion between the original and
copied products.
The defendant (copier) then could offer as affirmative defenses
that the primary consumer motivation for the purchase of the
product is the product (or features) rather than the source,3 4 1 or
that competition is or would be adversely affected by denying it
access to the copied product features,3 42 or a combination of
these.
Under such an approach, the burden would be on the copy-
ing defendant to justify its intentional act of copying nonu-
tilitarian product features.3 43 If the copier could show, as a
matter of fact, by at least a preponderance of the evidence, that
consumers are primarily motivated to purchase a product because
of particular nonutilitarian features irrespective of its source or, if
it could be shown that it can not compete without copying, e.g.,
because there are no viable alternatives, then the right to copy
341. This proof could be based on survey evidence or on the particular
product and circumstances surrounding its marketing. Cases involving cogni-
tive aesthetic functionality would seem to be instances where consumer motiva-
tion could be reasonably ascertainable.
342. A number of cases have taken into account the ability of competitors
to market successfully alternative noncopied designs. Compare Ives Laboratories,
Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 488 F. Supp. 394, 399 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (inability of cop-
ier to market drug in different colored capsule was relied upon as evidence of
functionality of the original colors) with SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Lab-
oratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980) (competitors successfully marketed
drug in different color). See also Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685
F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1982); Artus Corp. v. Nordic Co., 512 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Pa.
1981); LeSportsac, Inc. v. Dockside Research, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 602 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (availability of competing designs was taken into account in finding design
functional). For a further discussion of Ideal Toy, see supra note 276 and accom-
panying text.
343. In the suggested approach, the burden would still be upon plaintiff to
prove that the copied product or feature is nonutilitarian functional as part of its
prima facie case. This would be more consistent with free competition theory
than would be making all forms of functionality a defense, as may be the result
under LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985). For a fur-
ther discussion of LeSportsac, see supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
The right to copy, in theory, at least requires free access to utilitarian prod-
ucts in the public domain, i.e., unprotected by utility patents. Hence, the likeli-
hood that utilitarian products would be protected would be increased at the
expense of diminished competition in such products if the burden were placed
on the copier; originators would be more likely to obtain injunctions and the
copier would be less likely to copy. Moreover, requiring a copier to justify the
copying of utilitarian products converts the right to copy into a wrong (i.e., a
tort) and the tort of unprivileged imitation becomes one in which the copier
must prove that it is privileged to copy utilitarian features. In addition, it would
appear that the originator of a product would be in a better position to explain
why a particular design was selected.
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would be established, with the caveat that the copier must identify
itself as the source of the particular product.
The same approach should be taken in trademark infringe-
ment cases under section 32 of the Lanham Act, with the qualifi-
cation that, if a three-dimensional product may be validly
registered as a trademark for itself, the trademark is entitled to a
presumption of validity under the Lanham Act.3 44 Hence, it
would not be incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the nonu-
tilitarian nature of its registered mark, but the defendant (copier)
would have to rebut the presumption with evidence of utilitarian
functionality.
Because jurisdiction over trademark infringement is in the
federal district courts, these courts would apply the prevailing
standard of functionality within their respective circuits. It may
be necessary to resolve any conflict between the circuit standard
and that of the CAFC in Morton-Norwich. Moreover, a court hear-
ing an infringement case may treat the presumption of validity as
a weak one because of the requirement imposed by the CAFC that
the PTO register a three-dimensional product as a trademark, un-
less the PTO proves that the product is dejure functional ("utilita-
rian"). 345  In addition, as an affirmative defense, the copier
should have the opportunity to establish that consumers are moti-
vated to purchase the product for nonutilitarian reasons and that
competition would be adversely affected if copying were barred.
Admitting such an affirmative defense would conflict with present
CAFC practice in registration cases, but it is consistent with the
policy rationale of the Lanham Act-protecting trade identity and
consumers-as recently restated by the Supreme Court in Inwood
Laboratory, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. 346 Additionally, on balance
344. Lanham Act § 33, 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (1982) (registration as defense
rovision). Compare Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 775-
6 (9th Cir. 1981) (registered trademark; burden on copier to overcome pre-
sumption of validity) with International Order of job's Daughters v. Lindburg &
Co., 633 F.2d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 1980) (unregistered "common law" mark; bur-
den on creator to prove mark did not comprise "functional aesthetic compo-
nents of the product"). For a further discussion of Vuitton et Fils, see supra notes
290-95 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Job's Daughters, see
supra note 251-55 and accompanying text.
345. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1342 (C.C.P.A.
1982). The burden on the PTO was somewhat ameliorated in In re Teledyne
Indus., 696 F.2d 968 (Fed. Cir. 1982), permitting the PTO to establish a prima
facie case of functionality by dissecting the design according to its various fea-
tures. For a further discussion of functionality, see Oddi, supra note 55.
346. 456 U.S. 844, 861-62 (1982). Requiring the copier to justify copying
nonutilitarian features is consistent, in a sense, with the Supreme Court's con-
clusion that the functionality of the color of the copied drug capsules was "rele-
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this approach would still provide a reasonable incentive for the
creation of aesthetically pleasing and unique products by placing
the burden on the copier to justify its copying on competitive
grounds.
Placing the burden on the defendant copier to establish an
affirmative defense that consumers are primarily motivated for
nonutilitarian reasons or that competition will be adversely af-
fected if copying is denied would provide a proper balance be-
tween free and fair competition. This is in contrast to the present
dichotomy, where at the free competition end of the spectrum,
access is granted to a copier on the basis of a feature providing an
"important ingredient in commercial success," while at the fair
competition end, copying of a feature in the public domain is de-
nied unless it can be shown that it is the most efficient means for
performing a particular function. If protection against copying is
afforded products associated with a particular source, yet con-
sumers on the basis of the product and market conditions are in-
different to source, providing incentives for the creation of such
products promotes overinvestment in product differentiation.
This may circumvent the quid pro quo for the incentive of promot-
ing "Science and the Useful Arts" and, moreover, imposes in-
creased costs on consumers through diminished competition.
vant" to the issue of contributory trademark infringement. For a further
discussion of unprivileged imitation, see supra notes 88-95 and accompanying
text.
The Court reversed Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 638 F.2d 538
(2d Cir. 1981), because the Second Circuit failed to apply the clearly erroneous
standard of review and disregarded the district court's finding of nonfunctional-
ity; the Court would require the copier to provide a "legitimate reason" for the
intentional copying of the size, shape, and colors of the capsules. 456 U.S. at
862. Under the approach suggested in this article, after a prima facie showing of
nonutilitarian functionality by the plaintiff, it would be incumbent upon the cop-
ier to justify its copying as an affirmative defense in order to privilege its other-
wise tortious conduct, with evidence of consumer motivation and effect on
competition being relevant to establishing the affirmative defense.
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